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Abstract 
The parties to the UN climate negotiations have time and again failed to agree on ambitious 
emissions reductions targets that can “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system” (UN, 1992, p. 9). Lately, state leaders and UN officials have expressed great 
hopes for finally reaching a universal and legally binding climate agreement at this year’s 
meeting of the UNFCCC parties in Paris. Game-theoretical perspectives on climate 
negotiations tell another story. The UN climate negotiations are characterized as a Prisoners’ 
Dilemma where countries are better off free riding on the efforts of others. Thus, an effective 
climate agreement must ensure that countries’ incentives for participation and compliance be 
restructured.  
 
Drawing on the argument that climate change is a global public good, I argue that a club 
approach can achieve such restructuring under the right circumstances. Previous scholarly 
contributions in the field of club theory (mainly David Victor) propose climate clubs as a 
setting that enables countries willing to use own resources to combat climate change to 
coordinate their efforts and simultaneously create incentives for reluctant countries to 
participate. The analysis focuses on two types of incentives that enthusiastic countries might 
utilize in a club context, namely conditional commitments and club goods. Exploring various 
models and proposals of such incentives and using both primary and secondary sources, I aim 
to advance current knowledge concerning the prospects for effective climate cooperation 
through climate clubs. I argue that, it is the very ties between conditional commitments and 
club goods that might strengthen participation and compliance. I find that under the right 
circumstances, these incentives can successfully induce reluctant countries to follow suit. In 
particular, a club approach can help change the climate change mitigation game into a 
coordination game. However, I also find that a troubling U.S.-China relationship, risks of 
carbon leakage, processes of negative spillover into other multilateral efforts, existing trade 
laws, and protectionist concerns constitute substantial barriers for developing an effective 
climate club.  
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1 Introduction 
According to article 2 of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), the treaty aims at stabilizing greenhouse gases in the atmosphere to 
avoid dangerous human- made climate changes. The parties to the agreement have further 
operationalized this objective to keeping global average warming below 2°C, compared to 
pre-industrial levels (UN, 2010, article 2). However, recent analyses conducted by the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) establish that national governments have failed to 
implement the necessary measures and policies to meet this target by 2020, as outlined in the 
Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period. In fact, the increase of annual anthropogenic 
GHG emissions is accelerating (IPCC, 2014). If the parties continue their emissions in the 
same manner, they will have to face higher costs and risks in order to meet the demands of 
the Climate Convention (UNEP, 2013). Several scholars have pinned national governments’ 
failure of meeting own Kyoto targets to the protocol’s defective enforcement mechanisms 
and argued that it has not provided sufficient incentives for participation and compliance (see 
Hovi et al., 2013; Barrett, 2007). 
 
The UNFCCC’s lack of success in effectively managing climate mitigation has resulted in a 
range of research on alternative institutional designs that could facilitate an effective climate 
agreement. Considering effectiveness as a major criterion for a successful agreement, Hovi et 
al. (2013, p. 139) define an effective climate agreement as one causing “substantial emissions 
reductions”. The term “substantial” is not based on any particular target, contrary to the 2°C 
target adopted by the UN. The authors argue that an effective climate agreement can be 
reached either directly (by immediately entering into an “all-party climate agreement with 
potent enforcement mechanisms”) or indirectly (by gradually preparing for an all-party 
agreement) (Hovi et al., 2013, p. 145).  “Climate clubs” have been proposed as an 
institutional setting that indirectly might reach an effective climate agreement, provided that 
it offers sufficient incentives for participation and compliance. 
 
Several theoretical contributions have been published on clubs, as further presented in section 
1.2. Some have focused specifically on climate clubs. David Victor’s book Global Warming 
Gridlock (2011) stands out in this respect because it explains why and how a club approach is 
useful to ensure effective international cooperation on climate change mitigation. First of all, 
solving the climate change problem poses extraordinary political challenges compared to 
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other environmental agreements. Combined with the fact that climate change mitigation 
represents a global public good, the considerable time span between political decisions and 
the benefits of emissions reductions causes a free rider problem at the international level. 
According to Barrett (2007), in order to overcome free riding, climate negotiations need to be 
transformed from a collaboration game into a coordination game. Doing so demands a 
restructuring of participating countries’ incentives. Furthermore, the discussion on climate 
change is characterized by large gaps between countries when it comes to responsibility, 
vulnerability and capability to address the issue. An effective climate agreement has to find 
mechanisms that can bridge these gaps. Victor (2011) explains the UN gridlock by pointing 
to this unique combination of political issues posed by climate change. In his opinion, the use 
of binding universal law is not suited to combat climate change despite it being functional in 
other fields of international environmental collaboration. Additionally, veto mechanisms 
obstruct the UNFCCC from reaching an agreement that meets the necessary enforcement 
requirements.  Instead, applying a logic based on economic considerations and national self-
interest, he launches a “carbon club” as an alternative pathway to an effective climate 
agreement. The idea is that enthusiastic countries craft club benefits that under the right 
conditions can entice reluctant countries to join the club.  
 
My analysis concentrates on two main types of incentives: conditional commitments and club 
goods. Making implementation of own policies contingent on what other states do comprises 
the essence of conditional commitments. They can be crafted in many ways, as I explain in 
section 1.3.1. The second incentive, club goods, allows states to shift attention away from 
providing a public good for future generations and instead focus on producing economic and 
political benefits through mitigation activities, which benefits their present-day voters. Most 
importantly, the overall composition of club goods should compensate for taking on the costs 
of joining (also referred to as club fees). Section 1.3.2 provides examples of potential club 
goods. 
 
Throughout this thesis I draw on Hovi et al.’s (2015, p. 7) definition of a climate club as “any 
group that (1) starts off with fewer member countries than the UNFCCC has and (2) aims to 
cooperate on one or more climate-change related activities, notably mitigation, adaptation, 
climate engineering, or climate compensation”. In order to limit the scope of my thesis I 
focus my attention to mitigation efforts. 
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In essence, an effective climate agreement is able to bring about substantial emissions 
reductions. To do so it must to deter states from free riding on mitigation efforts of other 
states that are willing to implement more ambitious climate policies. A climate club provides 
a setting where enthusiastic countries could motivate reluctant countries to follow suit by 
setting up sufficiently attractive incentives. Two main incentives a club could employ are 
conditional commitments and club goods.  
 
1.1 Research Question  
This thesis aims at answering the following research question: 
 
What are the conditions (if any) under which a club might lead to an effective climate 
agreement?  
 
In order to answer this question, I examine the possibility of applying two types of incentives 
in a climate club through the following sub-questions: 
 
1) Under which conditions can conditional commitments by enthusiastic countries 
induce reluctant countries to follow suit?  
 
2) Under which conditions can club goods induce reluctant countries to follow suit? 
 
1.2 Previous Research  
Barrett’s (2007) game- theoretical contribution on the nature of the climate change issue and 
obstacles for international cooperation on the matter serve as a backdrop for the discussion on 
climate clubs. I especially draw on his conclusion, which claims that a future climate 
agreement has to succeed in restructuring the incentives for participation and compliance. In 
his opinion, the Kyoto Protocol failed to do so. He advocates technical standards as a way 
forward towards transforming the climate change mitigation game from a Prisoners’ 
Dilemma to a coordination game. I argue that, under the right circumstances, a club approach 
can similarly create a coordination game by providing attractive club benefits. 
 
The club approach is built on previous research on cooperation in small groups. Buchanan’s 
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(1965) prominent club-theoretical work added club goods to the previous polarized 
categorization of goods (private versus public goods). Sandler and Tschirhart (1997) expand 
on Buchanan’s (1965) characteristics of club goods. Furthermore, Prakash and Potoski (2007) 
present a second club model: “voluntary clubs”. Their model focuses on crucial elements that 
might be included in the institutional design to deter free riding and non-compliance.  
 
Another strand of literature relevant for analysing the prospects of applying a club approach 
on climate change mitigation focuses on climate governance architectures. Zelli et al. (2010) 
discuss how fragmented architectures influence the efficiency of policies. The authors 
investigate four factors in particular: speed, ambition, participation and equity. 
 
Moving on to the academic literature on existing climate clubs, Weischer et al. (2012) present 
a comprehensive evaluation of 17 clubs’ contribution to climate change mitigation. They 
divide existing climate clubs into two groups: dialogue forums and implementation groups. 
However, the scholars find that none of these have been able to induce reluctant countries 
and thus produce transformational changes, according to the targets proposed by the scientific 
community. Andresen (2014) similarly reviews a selection of exclusive approaches that 
facilitate climate change cooperation.  He questions the effectiveness and legitimacy of these 
regimes compared to the UNFCCC.  
 
Lastly, Victor (2011) presents “Carbon clubs” as a third club model. The idea is that 
enthusiastic countries agree on conditional, complex deals and install incentives to entice 
reluctant countries to join the club by negotiating similar deals. Still, Victor claims that 
developing club policies and mechanisms that could introduce an effective climate agreement 
would most likely face serious barriers at the domestic level: “The losers are well positioned 
to block costly changes, the winners aren’t yet on the field, and the broader public won’t see 
much benefit from a cleaner environment for some time” (2011, p. 119). In order to close the 
time span between political decisions and benefits from emissions reductions, a club would 
have to change this dynamic of winners and losers. 
 
1.2.1 Contribution to Previous Research 
My review of previous research on climate clubs reveals that none of the currently existing 
climate clubs have managed to bring about transformational change as envisioned by Victor 
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(2011). Accordingly, research should focus on how a future climate club can implement 
ambitious climate policies instead of merely establishing itself as yet another discussion club 
in the existing “regime complex” (Andersen, 2014; Keohane & Victor, 2011). In short, it is 
necessary to analyse whether a club approach is in fact capable of doing what the UNFCCC 
has failed to do: construct an effective climate agreement.  
 
By examining under what conditions conditional commitments and club goods can 
successfully incentivise reluctant countries, I hope to gain a better understanding of whether a 
club approach might constitute an alternative to the UN track. My thesis contributes to the 
existing literature on climate clubs by providing a thorough analysis of main elements of a 
club and of the conditions affecting these elements’ ability to actually engage reluctant 
countries to take part in ambitious climate policies. Scholars have directed their attention to 
establishing conditions for either well-functioning conditional commitments or club goods. I 
combine the two incentives and methodically assess proposed models for conditional 
commitments and club goods.  
 
1.3 Research Design 
The aim of this thesis is to assess whether a club approach is a suitable theoretical framework 
for developing an effective climate agreement as an alternative to existing modes of 
cooperation. The assumption that a small group of enthusiastic countries might induce 
reluctant countries to join if the right incentives are applied functions as a theoretical starting 
point. The feasibility of a club approach is examined through a twofold analysis of possible 
incentives a climate club could incorporate, namely conditional commitments and club 
goods. These incentives are closely connected when it comes to the prospects of solving free- 
riding at the international level. Both analyses are structured according to conditions for 
successfully counteracting free-riding and incentivising reluctant countries. The following 
paragraphs present the main features of each club element.  
 
1.3.1 Conditional Commitments 
The fourth chapter aims to render visible under what conditions conditional commitments 
launched by enthusiastic countries may motivate reluctant countries to contribute to the 
global public good. Previous research suggests that the leader’s level of credibility and 
leverage are central factors but depend on followers’ ability to coordinate their efforts to 
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meet the leader’s condition. Such coordination is achieved most easily if the public gains are 
shared evenly (Helland et al., 2015). This previous research also establishes that, even under 
favourable conditions, conditional commitments do not fully solve the free-rider problem at 
the international level. I introduce legitimacy as a fourth condition that moderates a climate 
club’s chances of producing an effective climate agreement. Carbon leakage, fragile China-
U.S. relations and states advocating conflicting burden-sharing principles are some of the 
impediments for realising this outcome.  
 
The concept of conditionality can be incorporated in a club in numerous ways and I assess 
these various forms of conditional commitments. The EU’s 20-20 by 2020 policy plan serves 
as an example of how an enthusiastic leader can attempt to induce reluctant countries to 
implement ambitious emissions reduction targets. Victor (2011) outlines the concept of 
contingent commitments as loosely framed and non-binding agreements that are negotiated 
through Climate Accession Deals (CADs). The commitments are termed contingent because 
the bids made by each state concerning what policies it might implement are conditional 
upon what measures other members adopt.  
 
1.3.2 Club Goods 
A club good is a good provided to its club members with minimal rivalry in consumption and 
where exclusion demands small costs (Hovi et al. 2015, p. 1741). In theory, there are endless 
possibilities of which activities and policies club members could cooperate on. Academic 
suggestions include mutually advantageous terms of trade and investment, cooperation in 
R&D programs in renewable energy technology and access to carbon markets (Hovi et al., 
2015, p 11; Weischer et al., 2012, p. 188). I explore these suggestions through in-depth 
studies of previous usage of such instruments and reviews of theoretical contributions about 
how to install them in a climate club. 
 
Under the right circumstances, club goods may be able to deter reluctant countries from free 
riding on the mitigation efforts of others and instead entice them to participate. However, the 
success of applying club goods as incentives is subject to specific conditions. The second part 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Hovi et al. (2015) base their definition on Ostrom et al.’s (1994) work on common-pool resources. Contrary to 
the definition of club goods applied by Buchanan (1965), the authors include goods without congestion effects 
in their use and also goods that generate benefits that increases together with higher levels of participation, 
which is a prerequisite for installing successful club goods in a climate club. 
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of the analysis aims to outline how these conditions affect club goods’ ability to motivate 
outsiders to join the club in order to get a share of these exclusive benefits. I apply Weischer 
et al.’s (2012, p. 192) suggested conditions. The first condition is significance. Significant 
club goods are a pre-requisite for tipping reluctant countries’ cost-benefit analysis of club 
membership in the right direction. Secondly, in order to deter free riding on the club’s efforts, 
club goods must be kept exclusive. Scholars have questioned how a climate club can ascertain 
that the club goods do not benefit outsiders in the future, for instance through technology 
diffusion. The third condition relates to developing a catalogue of club goods that provides 
benefits to all members. In order to incentivise as many countries as possible to join the club, 
club benefits have to accommodate the needs of all its members. The fourth condition 
requires club goods to be integrative with existing international law. International regulations 
might pose obstacles for establishing certain club goods and should be considered. Lastly, 
based on Weischer et al. (2012), I use credibility as a fifth condition. Installing trade 
restrictions as sanctions in a club is closely connected to the issue of credibility.  
 
1.3.3 Method 
The concepts of conditional commitments and club goods are applied as analytical tools to 
study how a climate club might deal with specific challenges of free riding associated with 
climate agreements. In effect, this means outlining under what conditions each element can 
be effective and assessing whether a climate club can fulfil these conditions. The analytical 
perspectives complement each other and incorporating only one of these elements in a club 
might limit the effect of applying such incentives.  
 
Building on previous scholarly contributions, the analysis is guided by an exploratory 
approach. Because conclusions from previous research suggest that a climate club similar to 
Victor’s proposal does not yet exist, empirical observations of current clubs are not suitable 
for answering my research question. Coupled together with the fact that my thesis deals with 
the prospects of creating a future climate agreement, it cannot be classified as a case study. 
Nor would it be reasonable to assume that it provides a full account of what a future climate 
club could look like. The suggestions on potential club benefits and club designs are vast. As 
a consequence, I cannot rule out the possibility that important factors might have been 
omitted from my analysis. This means that the results may to some degree be biased due to 
choices of including certain factors while overlooking others. Still, the analysis is well 
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founded in academic literature on clubs and climate negotiations, thereby limiting these risks. 
Thus, the analysis provides key insights about which issues some of the main proposed 
models of conditional commitments and club goods are likely to face. This knowledge can be 
useful for policy-makers that consider using these tools to form a coalition of countries 
willing to address global warming. The analysis especially concerns itself with aspects of 
political feasibility, international regulations, and economic considerations, and how policy-
makers might respond to these interacting processes. Also, it deals with some major emitters 
more than others due to their pivotal role in climate change negotiations. The United States, 
China and the EU are subject to particular attention.  
 
1.3.4 Sources 
In order to arrive at a better understanding of how specific policy instruments can be applied 
in a climate club, I apply sources of academic literature in addition to published policy 
documents and agreements. Parts of the analysis are largely founded on secondary literature. 
With regard to the research question, competing theoretical views on the prospects of an 
indirect effective climate agreement are scrutinized.  
 
Additionally, the thesis makes use of specific primary sources. First of all, reports issued by 
the IPCC provide the necessary scientific background on global warming. Secondly, the 
original text of the UNFCCC (1992) and following climate treaties are treated as essential 
sources for understanding the objectives and processes behind the climate negotiations this 
far. In chapter four, documents released by the Council of the European Union and the 
Commission of the European Communities are analysed to gain insight into the European 
Union’s climate and energy policies, most notably it’s 20-20-20 policy objectives. In order to 
assess the prospects for successful cooperation through the U.S.-China Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue (S&ED), reports published by the U.S.-China Climate Change Working 
Group (CCWG) are utilized. Furthermore, the analysis examines U.S. legislation on climate 
policies to advance knowledge about domestic political factors that steer the state’s behaviour 
in international climate negotiations. In the fifth chapter, the discussion on trade-related 
measures and international regulations utilizes several documents published by the WTO, 
especially the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (1994) and the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (1994). Lastly, a World 
Bank report (2007) on gains from liberalizing trade on clean energy technologies provides 
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valuable information on the matter. 
 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
This thesis consists of six chapters, including the introduction. In chapter two, the 
background for and the development of the global climate negotiations are presented. The 
third chapter explains the rationale for and key aspects of the club approach, before reviewing 
previous research specifically related to climate clubs. The fourth chapter embarks on the 
analysis by discussing potential designs of conditional commitments. Chapter five 
investigates potential club goods according to conditions for successfully applying them as 
incentives for reluctant countries. Potential challenges are outlined in both chapters. Lastly, 
the sixth chapter summarizes the main points of the analysis and reflects on their implications 
for a club approach. 
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2  Climate Negotiations 
The following chapter outlines the role of the IPCC, the emergence of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol and central 
amendments to these agreements. The purpose is to provide some background for the ensuing 
analysis of climate clubs.  
 
2.1 IPCC 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was founded by UNEP and WMO 
in 1988 and remains under the auspices of the UN (Alfsen et al., 2000). IPCC has held a 
central position in the UNFCCC process and provides the scientific basis for political 
decisions by continually assessing new evidence of climate change, especially anthropogenic 
changes2. Part of the evaluations made by the panel is collected in assessment reports issued 
approximately every 5th year. So far, five assessment reports have been released with the 
latest finalized in 2013/2014. IPCC’s work is structured in three working groups, a task force 
and a task group (IPCC, 2014). The IPCC Working Group I (WG I) concentrates on the 
physical scientific evidences of climate change. The IPCC Working Group II (WG II) deals 
with climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability whereas the IPCC Working Group 
III (WG III) focuses on climate change mitigation. The latest volume issued by WG I as part 
of the 5th assessment report renders visible the intricately connected and unpredictable 
challenges of climate change (IPCC, 2013). It presents evidence of warming in the 
atmosphere, ocean and cryosphere3 that gives rise to changes in extreme weather; ocean 
acidification; glacier melting; reduction of mass on the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets; 
and sea level rise, among other events. The report establishes that human influence on the 
climate system is unmistakable as supported by “increasing greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere, positive radiative forcing, observed warming, and understanding of the 
climate system” (IPCC, 2013, p. 15).  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Anthropogenic climate changes are man-made changes to the climate. 
3 The cryosphere are the portions of the Earth’s surface where water is in solid form, frozen into ice or snow. 
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2.2 The United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
During the 1980s global warming as a result of changes in the atmospheric chemical 
composition became a growing concern for natural scientific researchers (Alfsen et al., 2000, 
p. 7). As a consequence of the increased focus on climate change, partly through IPCC’s 
work, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) established a working group with the purpose of outlining a draft for an 
international climate treaty. In 1990 the General Assembly of the United Nations (GA) set up 
the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (INC/FCCC) that drafted the UNFCCC adopted at the United Nations Conference4 
held in Rio de Janeiro 1992. Today there are 196 parties to the convention5 (UN, 2014f). The 
ultimate objective of the treaty is, as stated in article 2: 
  
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level 
should be achieved within a time- frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt 
naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to 
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner (UN, 1992, p. 9).  
 
One of the main principles outlined in article 3 is the responsibility of developed countries to 
“take the lead in combating climate change” (UN, 1992, p. 9). In order to follow this 
principle of burden sharing, the parties of the Convention are divided into three groups: 
Annex I countries, Annex II countries and developing countries. Annex I contains a list of 
industrialised countries whereas Annex II comprises the industrialised countries that were 
members of the OECD at the time the treaty was signed.  The Annex I countries committed 
to stabilising emissions at their 1990 levels by the year 2000 but the treaty did not 
specifically operationalize the targeted amount of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the 
atmosphere or outline the measures needed to accomplish this goal. Furthermore, these 
targets were not legally binding. However, the Convention mattered in that it recognized the 
issue of climate change as a first step towards climate change negotiations. The Conference 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also called Earth Summit. 
5 195 countries and 1 regional economic integration organisation. 
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of the Parties (COP) functions as the governing body of the UNFCCC with annual meetings. 
The following sections outline key COPs that have taken place and their outcomes. 
 
2.3 The Kyoto Protocol 
In 1997, COP3 was held in Kyoto and resulted in the Kyoto Protocol.  Formal reviews of the 
the UNFCCC’s development concluded that “the voluntary aim approach” needed to be 
altered in order to reach the ultimate objective outlined in article 2 (Oppenheimer & Petsonk, 
2005, p. 204). As a result, the protocol introduced legally binding emission reduction targets 
for the Annex I countries with a commitment period lasting from 2008-2012 (Ramakrishna, 
2000). By doing so, the protocol followed the principle of developed countries leading the 
organisation’s mitigation efforts. The protocol entered into force in 2005 after 55 Annex I 
countries responsible for at least 55 % of total carbon dioxide emissions in 1990 signed and 
ratified the treaty (Alfsen et al., 2000). Each signatory’s specific emissions reductions 
commitments are outlined in the protocol’s Annex B.  The United States remained on the 
outside of the protocol, partly due to domestic concerns about developing countries (one of 
them being China) being exempted from legally binding reduction targets6 and the protocol’s 
effect on the national economy. The expected effect from accomplished targets in the 
protocol on global warming was minimal and the second commitment period needed to 
introduce more ambitious goals in order to have the necessary impact on the process of 
climate change. Additionally, the protocol’s enforcement mechanisms have been labelled 
weak (Grubb et al., 1999). Article 18 states that the parties should establish effective 
procedures and mechanisms in order to deal with non-compliance at the next COP. A final 
agreement on this was reached in Marrakech in 2001. The Marrakesh accords provided a set 
of compliance mechanisms to promote compliance and establish procedures for cases of non-
compliance (Nentjes & Klaassen, 2004).  
 
2.3.1 Flexibility Mechanisms 
The Kyoto Protocol established three flexibility mechanisms for cost-efficient cooperation on 
emission reductions. Each mechanism has its own trading units and is equal to one tonne of 
CO2. Registry systems at UN level and national levels administer the emissions trading 
scheme (UN, 2014c). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The U.S. Senate reached a unanimous decision on not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol unless key developing 
countries also were bound by ”specific scheduled commitments” (Senate Resolution 98, 1997). The decision is 
also known as the Byrd Hagel resolution.  
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I) International Emissions Trading (ET) 
On the basis of the percentages inscribed in Annex B, each country is able to calculate its 
allowed emissions in the form of assigned amount units (AAU). Any country with a surplus 
of AAU can trade units with another country that has exceeded its target. The commodity 
exchange is carried out in the international carbon market.  
 
II) Joint Implementation (JI) 
In order to meet its target, Annex B countries can earn emissions reduction units (ERUs) by 
contributing to an emissions reduction project in other Annex B countries (UN, 2014d). 
Depending on the host country’s ability to meet certain eligibility criteria, signatories can 
follow track 1 or track 2 procedures. In the latter, the Joint Implementation Supervisory 
Committee (JISC) establishes a body that decides if the JI project in question account for 
additional emission reductions or enhancement of emission removal than would otherwise be 
the case. 
 
III) Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
Entering into force in 2006, the CDM can be characterised as the first international, 
environmental investment and credit scheme. It includes non-annex I parties as well as 
industrialised countries. By assisting developing countries in “achieving sustainable 
development” through financing certified project activities, Annex I countries can earn 
certified emission reduction (CER) credits that help towards meeting their commitments7 
("Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change," 1998, 
article 12).  Examples of project activities are use of solar panels in rural electrification 
projects and setting up energy-efficient boilers (UN, 2014b). After a third party verifies 
emission reductions as a result of the project, carbon credits are handed out by the CDM 
executive board. Next the project developer sells these credits to any interested industrialised 
country (UN, 2014a). According to recent numbers provided by the UNFCCC, 266 
programmes of activities (PoAs) are in place and the 2013 report on CDM issued by the 
CDM executive board informed of 7293 registered projects (UN, 2013; UN, 2014e).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 CERs acquired between 2000-2008 can be used by Annex I countries to meet reduction targets set out in the 
first commitment period (UN, 1998). 
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2.4 The Copenhagen Accord 
The COP15 in Copenhagen was characterised by a tug of war between parties advocating a 
legally binding agreement (e.g. EU and Norway) and parties reluctant to agree to any binding 
reduction targets (e.g. the United States and Canada) (Stryken, 2013). It resulted in the 
Copenhagen accord that lists national, voluntary pledges on targets for the year 2020 and 
contain no binding emissions reduction commitments. The parties agreed that “deep cuts in 
global emissions are required according to science, and as documented by the IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report with a view to reduce global emissions so as to hold the increase in global 
temperature below 2°C, and take action to meet this objective consistent with science and on 
the basis of equity”(UN, 2010, article 2). The 2°C target was originally launched as a policy 
objective by the EU in 1996, after recommendations from the scientific community 
(Randalls, 2010, p.598). Several developing countries did not agree to the accord based on 
lack of concrete targets and some accused the drafting process of being an unofficial 
procedure with only 25 selected state leaders participating8 (The Economist, 2010). As a 
consequence, the seven pages long document was merely taken note of by the COP15. In 
other words, the accord functioned as a set of goals the parties could choose to adopt. 
The conference was considered to achieve only marginally tangible outcomes by both the 
media and public but some signs of progress could be detected. Contrary to the Kyoto 
Protocol, the Copenhagen accord establishes that “mitigation actions taken by non-Annex I 
countries will be subject to their domestic measurement, reporting and verification the result 
of which will be reported through their national communications every two years” (UN, 
2010, article 5). Some argued that this recognition of developing countries’ responsibilities in 
mitigation efforts was crucial in overcoming the divide between developed and developing 
countries that to some degree had obstructed previous climate negotiations (The Economist, 
2009). The Copenhagen accord decided to set up a Green Climate Fund (GCF) as a financial 
mechanism in order to support adaptation measures; the REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation) project; and technology transfers and development in 
the developing countries. As a last point, the accord advises “an assessment of the 
implementation of this Accord to be completed by 2015” (UN, 2010, p. 7). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua protested about the procedure and Lumumba Stanislaus Di-Aping of 
Sudan voiced concern on behalf of the G77+ China group about the treatment of developing countries (The 
Economist, 2010). 
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2.5 The Durban Platform, the Doha Amendment, and the 
Road Towards Paris 
The COP-17 held in Durban in 2011 decided that the following COPs would focus on 
preparing a legally binding deal to be agreed on at COP-21 in Paris, 2015 (Hedegaard, 2012). 
Negotiations followed a new structure as “The Durban Platform”, gathering all the parties in 
one forum, replaced the old system of working groups that differentiated between developed 
and developing countries. The conference established an Ad Hoc Working Group on the 
Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) in order “to develop a protocol, another legal 
instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all 
Parties” (UN, 2012, p. 2). The parties are expected to finish a first draft of the new agreement 
at COP-20 in Lima, Peru, in December 2014 based on the negotiation text drafted by the 
working group.   
 
In the following COP-18 held in Doha, Quatar, “the Doha Climate Gateway” aimed at 
mobilizing political will towards meeting the 2015 deadline for a universal agreement 
binding its signatories to ambitious mitigation efforts from the year 2020 (UN, 2014g). The 
conference produced a document of amendments to the Kyoto protocol, namely the Doha 
Amendment. It launched a second commitment period lasting from 2013 to 2020 and 
provided rules on how AAUs dating from the first commitment period could be transferred to 
the second commitment period. With 30 countries having ratified the amendment (as of 7th 
May, 2015) it has not yet entered into force (UN, 2015).  
 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, saw the climate summit in New 
York, September 2014, as creating the political momentum needed to reach a universal, 
binding agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol in Paris 2015 (UN, 2014h). Others have 
shared his optimistic view on the prospects of a productive outcome at COP-21 with regards 
to political events that have occurred in China, the U.S. and India following the failed attempt 
at reaching a climate agreement in Copenhagen. The new Chinese president, Xi Jinping, is 
said to prioritise climate policy to a larger degree than the previous president, Hu Jintao. A 
move to greener politics is also believed to follow the inauguration of new Indian Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi (The Economist, 2014).  
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2.6 Summary 
First, the chapter’s section on IPCC provided a short introduction to the organization’s work 
and presented the basic scientific processes behind global warming. Next, the UNFCCC and 
the most important agreements that have emerged from the following COPs were presented. 
These are the Kyoto Protocol and its flexibility mechanisms, the Copenhagen Accord, the 
Durban Platform and the Doha Climate Gateway. Overall, the chapter provides a backdrop 
for discussing the current gridlock in the UN climate regime. Next chapter presents a game 
theoretical framework for understanding this gridlock and global climate negotiations in 
general. Furthermore, it outlines previous scholarly contributions on club theory. 
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3 Club Approach 
This chapter outlines the club approach to climate cooperation. It starts out by reviewing how 
the nature of the climate change issue and game- theoretic premises about the provision of 
global public goods necessitate employing a club approach to achieve effective mitigation 
instead of merely continuing along the UN track of climate negotiations. A future climate 
agreement needs to be founded on a restructuring of incentives in order to surmount the 
problem of free- riding. Under the right circumstances, a climate club could fulfil this task. 
Furthermore, previous theory on clubs is presented, ranging from general club theory to 
theoretical contributions specifically addressing climate clubs. 
 
3.1 Game Theory and Global Public Goods  
Arguments in favour of an alternative approach to international cooperation on climate 
change can be found in the literature on global public goods. Barrett (2007) deals with the 
provision of global public goods using game theory. He defines global public goods as non-
rival and non-excludable goods that benefit all of humanity and argues that these 
characteristics pose problems for the provision of such goods. Even though global public 
goods range from climate change mitigation to prevention of mass disease, Barrett thinks that 
successful incentives to supply a global public good in one area can be the source of valuable 
knowledge for managing the provision of another type of public good. Nevertheless, the 
various global public goods are subdivided into groups according to whether they demand 
cooperation, level of financing, international institutions, challenges of enforcement, and the 
amount of states needed to contribute to the provision of these goods. The types are classified 
as single best efforts, weakest links, aggregate efforts, mutual restraint and coordination 
(Barrett, 2007, p.1).  
 
Using climate change mitigation as an example, aggregate efforts are especially prone to free 
riding due to a combination of four attributes (Barrett, 2007, p. 74). First of all, the survival 
of human kind does not hinge on the provision of this type of global public good. The 
consequences of highly damaging climate changes may indeed prove to be catastrophic but 
the uncertainties about the effects and outcomes are high. Coupled with the great amount of 
focus being given to adaptation measures and its prospects for solving issues related to 
climate change, there seems to be a widespread belief that societies will be able to adapt 
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before the occurrence of such detrimental events. Secondly, states vary according to 
vulnerabilities; responsibilities; and capacities to address the issue. This is what is commonly 
referred to as asymmetries between countries. Contrary to cases of single best efforts and 
weakest links, the event of climate change may actually benefit some countries. Another 
crucial point is the costly nature of mitigation efforts. The high costs associated with 
combating climate change could result in other goods being neglected and also give rise to 
new challenges. To demonstrate, emissions reductions would most likely result in an increase 
of nuclear energy use that in turn would exacerbate issues related to nuclear proliferation and 
waste storage. Lastly, successful mitigation depends on the total contribution of all states. In 
order to move past these issues and deter free riding, incentives to participate in mitigation 
efforts need to be restructured and ensure that “countries are better off participating than not 
participating, and better off complying than not complying” (Barrett, 2007, p. 93). In 
Barrett’s opinion, the Kyoto Protocol has failed at this task because it does not provide 
effective enforcement mechanisms that ensure participation and compliance to the agreement.  
 
Barrett (2007, p. 82) recommends using trade restrictions as enforcement for an agreement 
based on technical standards. To put it differently, mitigation efforts should be turned into a 
coordination game with tipping. According to Barrett, well-functioning trade restrictions 
have to fulfil two conditions; namely severity and credibility. Section 5.5.1 deals with the 
prospects of including credible trade restrictions in a climate club. A high participation level 
is specified as a necessary condition to avoid trade leakages9, which might be of some 
concern for the chances of institutionalising trade restrictions in a club, at least from an early 
stage. Although a coordination game based on technical standards may be a feasible approach 
to climate change mitigation, this thesis utilizes Barrett’s contribution in a different manner. 
It assesses to what extent a club approach can help change the climate change mitigation 
game from a Prisoners’ Dilemma to a coordination game. Because climate change mitigation 
is a Prisoners’ Dilemma, it is rational for states to free ride on others’ mitigation efforts. 
Increasing the participation level in the mitigation game entails that each state’s individual 
gains from participation are reduced (Hovi, 2008, p. 55). In other words, the best strategy is 
to defect (D), not cooperate (C). However, in a coordination game with tipping, the payoffs 
from contributing are higher than the payoffs from defecting after reaching a certain level of 
participants, i.e. after a certain tipping point (Barrett & Dannenberg, 2015). Barrett and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Trade leakage happens when production restrictions by a small group of countries creates an incentive for the 
production to be relocated to a country not subject to these restrictions (Barrett, 2007, p. 80). 
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Dannenberg (2015, p. 2) explain the game as follows: “on one side of the tipping point, no 
player wants to supply the public good; on the other side, every player wants to supply it”. 
Still, current UN climate negotiations continue to apply a Prisoner’s Dilemma approach: the 
underlying idea is that if all states choose to contribute, they will all benefit from reduced 
global warming. While a collaboration game can thus achieve the first best outcome, a 
coordination game with tipping is only able to achieve a second best outcome (Barrett & 
Dannenberg, 2015). Nevertheless, the strong incentives for free riding in a collaboration 
game make coordination games a strategically better option. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate the 
logic behind the two different approaches. To clarify, the thesis shifts focus from treating 
mitigation as a global public good towards examining how employing club goods, together 
with other measures, can restructure incentives for participating in mitigation efforts. Hence, 
it is crucial that enthusiastic countries provide incentives capable of attracting a sufficient 
amount of reluctant countries to reach the tipping point.  
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Figure 3.1: N-player Prisoners’ dilemma 
Source: Hovi (2008, p. 56) 
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Figure 3.2: Coordination game with tipping 
Source: Barrett (2003, p. 95). 
 
To conclude, global public goods theory can be applied as a supporting argument for 
adopting a new approach in order to provide reluctant countries with sufficient incentives to 
address global warming. While Barrett and Stavins (2003, p. 350) propose technical 
standards as a solution, the club approach represents a third path towards such restructuring. 
Under the right conditions, club benefits might induce states to join the club and comply with 
specific emissions reduction targets. 
 
3.2 Club Theory 
Drawing on Sandler and Tschirhart’s (1997, p. 335) definition, a club is “a voluntary group 
deriving mutual benefits from sharing one or more of the following: production costs, the 
member’s characteristics, or a good characterized by excludable benefits”.  
 
The economist James Buchanan’s (1965) work has remained in the forefront within the field 
of club theory. It aimed at developing new forms of ownership-consumption relationships. 
Up to this point, the theoretical debate had been centred on a polarization of purely private 
goods at one end of the spectrum and purely public goods at the other end. By launching the 
concept of club goods, Buchanan sought to change this perception. Club goods were 
described as excludable and with some possibilities for rivalry in their consumption in cases 
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of congestion. This form of goods could therefore be located between private goods (rivalry 
in consumption and costless exclusion) and public goods (no rivalry and no possibilities of 
exclusion).  
 
Sandler and Tschirhart (1997) provide a detailed account of other ways that club goods 
differentiate from pure public goods. First of all, club goods are by definition voluntary as 
opposed to public goods, which need not be. Members choose to take part in the club if they 
deem the benefits to be greater than the costs of joining. Secondly, because club goods are 
shared among members, congestion may occur. In their opinion, the possibility of congestion 
makes it a necessity to limit the size of the club. As a third point, Sandler and Tschirhart 
(1997) underscore the element of exclusivity. Clubs need effective mechanisms to exclude 
non-members from enjoying the club goods and to administer membership fees. However, 
the exclusion mechanism should also provide actors with incentives strong enough to deter 
free riding.  
 
In addition to the first club model proposed by Buchanan (1965), Prakash and Potoski (2007, 
p. 776) introduce “voluntary clubs” as a second model. These clubs were proposed as a 
solution to ensure the provision of positive social externalities. Attractive club goods might 
recruit new members but at the same time the voluntary model create social externalities and 
private benefits10. The social externalities can take on various forms ranging from private, 
public and club goods.  
 
Prakash and Potoski (2007) explain how the institutional design of voluntary environmental 
programmes may deter members from free riding and shirking11, which is similar to non-
compliance. The benefits of producing social externalities have to be excludable in order to 
decrease the possibilities of free riding on the club’s reputation. To solve the problem of 
shirking a club should establish compliance mechanisms, such as monitoring and sanctioning. 
Still, the level of non-compliance depends on the stringency of enforcement and monitoring 
rules. Prospective club members are required to meet certain club standards, which might be 
set up in different ways. One possibility would be to set outcome standards while another 
possibility is to tie the standards to certain processes members should adopt. A third option is 
to include only actors that already have met specific environmental standards. While stringent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Private benefits are individual gains subject to each member (Prakash & Potoski, 2007, p. 776). 
11 Shirking happens when members avoid or neglect their duties. 
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club standards can encourage members to contribute considerably more to social welfare than 
what public law requires them to, leninent club standards only help generate marginal social 
externalities beyond the legal requirements. Clubs using stringent standards can thus be 
labelled as high cost clubs and face fewer difficulties in differentiating between actors 
lagging behind and the ones capable of complying with the club requirements. In effect, the 
stakeholders are in the position to reward and punish actors for their performance.  
 
Prakash and Potoski (2007) urge policymakers to consider the policy context and the type of 
actors they wish to include when they institutionalise club standards and enforcement 
mechanisms. A club with lenient standards is preferable if policymakers wish to attract a 
wide range of members. But club standards that are too relaxed can reduce the “branding 
benefits” of club membership and thus discourage actors from joining the club (Prakash & 
Potoski, 2007, p. 781). Their work examines the optimal club size and the possibilities of 
crowding despite non-rivalrous benefits. Overall, Prakash and Potoski (2007) argue that a 
club approach is to prefer over unilateral action due to a higher credibility level following 
from the actors’ limited ability to change the rules by themselves.  
 
Zelli et al. (2010) have analysed the effects of fragmented climate governance architectures 
on the effectiveness of policies according to four factors: speed, ambition, participation and 
equity. Fragmented governance architectures are characterised by overlapping issues, 
international institutions, constituencies (public and private) and reach (e.g. global or 
regional). Starting out with speed, fragmented architectures can indeed prove to be prompter 
in concluding negotiations and enforcing agreements. However, the authors argue that despite 
early successes in agreements of this kind, it may prove harder to motivate other countries to 
join because the agreement already has been built on the interests of the founding members. 
Moving on to the second aspect of ambition, adopting a “narrow-but-deep” rather than a 
“broad-but-shallow” approach can in fact prove to be more productive (Zelli et al., 2010, p. 
28). In a setting like this, side-payments can be easier to establish seeing as national 
governments only bind themselves to one other country instead of a larger group. Barrett and 
Stavins (2003, p. 360) define a side-payment as “a direct money transfer made by one party 
or a set of parties to another”. It is important to note that Zelli et al. (2010) deploy a broader 
definition of side-payments and include transfer of technology and political support in other 
international organisations as well as trade concessions. In section 5.3.2 I outline the 
underlying idea and utility of side-payments. 
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The second factor deals with the ambition of climate policies. Economic studies suggest that 
in the field of emissions trading, a global trading scheme (e.g. the Kyoto Protocol) is more 
capable of fostering the necessary cutbacks in emissions compared to other alternatives that 
are more fragmented (e.g. formal or informal linkages of regional trading systems). The 
scholars state that a fragmented architecture “that do not unite all major actors in one 
coherent and consistent regulatory framework and that include conflicting norms and 
principles are likely to send confusing messages to all, reducing the overall performance of 
the system” (Zelli et al., 2010, p. 29). Thirdly, a fragmented system is more accessible for 
relevant actors and sectors (e.g. from private industry and business) to participate in than a 
static system. Lastly, the degree of fragmentation might negatively affect the agreement’s 
equity concerns. Similar to Victor’s (2011) proposal, other scholars have also focused on the 
possibilities inherent in a bottom-up approach of better accommodating the interests of 
various states. As experienced in previous climate negotiations, states have conflicting beliefs 
about which values international regulations should be based on. Whereas a fragmented 
regime that is adapted to countries’ differing interests might better ensure higher compliance 
rates among members, it can also run into problems concerning equity. Cooperation theory 
indicates that powerful states possess an unfair amount of bargaining power in bilateral and 
small-n agreements compared to large-n agreements where smaller states have the possibility 
of entering into coalitions to secure their interests. A governance architecture that is labelled 
unfair usually struggles with legitimacy issues, which in turn harms the system effectiveness.  
In their conclusion Zelli et al. (2010) argue that despite certain problems in theory, a 
fragmented governance system is a second best option to “purely universal governance 
architectures” that in many cases are unlikely to function effectively in real life. Section 4.4 
deals with the political legitimacy of conditional commitments and more generally touches 
on the overall legitimacy of a climate club. 
 
3.3 Existing “Climate Clubs” 
Several reviews of existing clubs’ abilities to produce transformational change and raise 
ambition in climate action have been made. Weischer et al. (2012, p.177) have mapped the 
current landscape of “climate clubs” and found that all 17 of them only support incremental 
change. They define a climate club as a group consisting of more than two countries but with 
fewer members than the amount of signatories to the UNFCCC. Also, a club differs from an 
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international organisation because it is less institutionalised and administered by national 
governments. Weischer et al. (2012, p. 178) define a transformational climate club as one that 
manages to produce “emissions reductions in line with what climate science suggests is 
needed to avoid dangerous climate change”. In order to do so it has to include the most 
relevant actors. A country is characterised as relevant on the basis of its political and strategic 
(leader within a region); economic (major producer or consumer); or symbolic (e.g. a state 
being especially vulnerable to climate change impacts) position. 
 
Andresen (2014) provides an assessment of the effectiveness of the Asia Pacific Partnership 
on Clean Development and Climate Change (APP), the Major Economies Forum on Energy 
and Climate (MEF) and the G20, in addition to a few other similar forums. The ability of 
these exclusive approaches to promote problem-solving effectiveness in a legitimate manner 
is examined in comparison to the output, outcome and impact caused by the UNFCCC. The 
article establishes that even though the bottom-up exclusive approaches have proven 
themselves as viable alternatives to the UN track, the effectiveness of these regimes are yet to 
be fully measured. A crucial point in the top-down versus bottom-up debate is the issue of 
legitimacy, which the UN scores high on. The forums subject to Andresen’s analysis 
acknowledge this fact and a club that would challenge the UN’s position within climate 
governance may face problems with legitimacy, an observation supported by Zelli et al. 
(2010). 
 
Having ruled out existing clubs as institutions able to promote transformational change, I turn 
to Victor’s (2011) proposal of a new type of climate club. Contrary to Weischer et al’s (2012) 
idea of bringing back the ambitions of a climate club to the UNFCCC, Victor believes that a 
club approach should replace the global negotiations under the UNFCCC. 
 
3.4  “Carbon Clubs” 
Victor’s (2011, p. 242) concept of “carbon clubs” provides a detailed explanation of why and 
how a club theoretical framework should be applied in mitigation efforts. The proposition is 
based on his understanding of why the climate negotiations up until now have been stuck in a 
global warming gridlock. He supports Barrett’s (2007) argument that the nature of the 
climate change issue causes extraordinary cooperation problems but stresses that policy 
makers should focus on what they can actually change: namely developing new policy 
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strategies. Uncovering myths related to the role of science, environmental diplomacy and 
technology for addressing global warming is presented as a step towards breaking the 
gridlock. Victor contradicts the idea that an effective climate agreement has to adopt a top-
down approach based on global goals that are agreed upon by the scientific community (such 
as limiting warming to 2°C). International treaties are believed to merely result in 
governments agreeing on “the lowest common denominator”(Victor, 2011, p. 6). Instead, 
Victor promotes a bottom-up approach that focuses on what policies governments are able 
and willing to implement in order to control emissions.  
 
Victor’s theoretical contribution emphasises that enthusiastic countries should take the 
leading role in order to motivate reluctant countries to control own emissions. Victor (2011, 
p. 242) envisions a “carbon club” as an institutional setting where enthusiastic countries can 
agree on complex deals while simultaneously producing club benefits that can function as 
incentives for reluctant countries to join the club. After joining the club, the new members 
would then have to negotiate their own accession deals. Victor (2011, p. 244) terms these 
deals  “Climate Accession Deals” (CADs) and uses the WTO accession process as a model 
for how states can bid and negotiate such conditional commitments. The myth that global 
warming is an environmental problem comprises Victor’s justification for leaving the UN 
track and turning to the WTO model for inspiration. He argues that the application of an 
environmental and not an economic perspective has led to failed attempts of tackling global 
warming based on earlier successful environmental diplomacy efforts (e.g. the Montreal 
Protocol). 
 
Victor (2011) defines enthusiastic countries as the countries willing to use own resources in 
mitigation efforts. The section on conditional commitment provides a discussion of the 
prospects for negotiating CADs and which states are able to craft commitments with enough 
leverage to induce other countries to follow suit. Victor investigates the various measures 
enthusiastic countries can adopt, most notably emissions trading. His suggestions are further 
addressed in the section on club goods, as are his models on how states can cooperate on 
technology policies.   
 
Reluctant countries on the other hand do not treat emissions reductions as a national interest 
of high priority. The essence of Victor’s argument is that enthusiastic countries should set up 
incentives (both positive and negative) that are strong enough to make reluctant countries re-
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prioritise their national interests by including emissions control. It is of high importance to 
motivate the group of reluctant states seeing as these are expected to account for the majority 
of carbon emissions in the future. Table 3.1 lists the enthusiastic and reluctant countries as 
proposed by Victor. 
 
Enthusiastic countries Reluctant countries 
United States  China 
European Union  India 
Japan Brazil 
Canada Indonesia 
Australia Korea 
 South Africa 
 Mexico 
 Taiwan 
 
Table 3.1: Victor’s categorization of enthusiastic and reluctant countries. 12 
Source: Victor (2011, p. 10). 
 
Victor (2011, p. 10) does not include “countries that are large carbon exporters and under 
little public pressure to regulate emissions, such as Russia and the largest OPEC members”. 
Furthermore, he also excludes smaller, low-income developing countries. These states 
account for small emissions and simply do not have enough resources to address global 
warming. In other words, they are not reluctant to participation but rather unable to take part 
in mitigation efforts. Because a climate club’s long-term goal is to include as many states as 
possible, I nevertheless focus parts of my analysis on how club benefits can be installed to 
accrue to smaller, developing countries as well.  
 
3.5 Summary 
First, the chapter presented game-theoretical understandings of climate negotiations and 
provisions of global public goods. I agued that a club approach can promote a transformation 
of the climate change mitigation game into a coordination game for club members. Second, I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Victor (2011, p. 10) includes ”other enthusiastic countries” as a group but does not inform the reader of 
which countries these are. He merely shows how they account for a smaller share of global GHG emisions than 
the other enthusiastic countries. 
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presented general club theory and focused on two main models: “the Buchanan model” and 
“the Voluntary Clubs model”. Third, I assessed how fragmented climate governance 
architectures might have implications for the effectiveness of policies. Fourth, the chapter 
presented previous research on existing climate clubs, which revealed that none are able to 
bring about transformational change. Lastly, I introduced Victor’s idea of “Carbon Clubs” 
and focused on the background for and design of his proposal. 
 
To conclude, the attributes of the global warming issue combined with critiques of the 
UNFCCC lay the ground for applying club theory as an alternative approach. By ruling out 
the prospects of existing climate clubs bringing about transformational change in mitigation 
efforts, Victor’s proposal of how a carbon club should be set up demands further attention. 
Chapter four constitutes the first part of my analysis and concentrates on using conditional 
commitments to induce reluctant countries to follow suit.   
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4 Conditional Commitments 
I now turn to conditional commitments as a potential incentive a climate club might use to 
solve the problem of free riding and conduct successful mitigation. In this chapter I examine 
the following question: Under which conditions can conditional commitments by enthusiastic 
countries induce reluctant countries to follow suit? As seen in chapter two, repeated games 
(typically based on the Prisoners’ Dilemma) have been applied to study how cooperation 
might be enhanced in global climate change negotiations. According to Underdal et al. (2012, 
p. 478) this strand of research sees “contingent strategies”, such as conditional commitments, 
as an instrument to promote mutual reciprocity and cooperation within an international 
anarchic setting. A leader’s attempt to create a coordination game for its followers can 
potentially help solve a Prisoners’ Dilemma. 
 
The idea of conditionality in international politics has produced a range of different concepts. 
Victor (2011, p. 243) uses the concept “contingent commitments” to describe Climate 
Accession Deals (CADs). Throughout my paper I apply the concept “conditional 
commitments” to refer to agreements based on reciprocity in a climate club. The EU’s 20-20-
20 policy is the most prominent example of a conditional commitment within the field of 
international climate cooperation. The EU launched emissions reduction targets and a 
promise to top up its contribution if other major actors were to respond with similar targets. 
The conditional commitment did not succeed and I examine the EU’s failure to induce its 
followers to introduce similarly ambitious emissions reductions. The concept of contingency 
is more complex and intricately established in Victor’s CADs than in the conditional 
commitments launched by the EU. Arguably, CAD model is more relevant for a club 
approach and the possibilities of establishing a climate club by such conditional offers is 
further investigated in this chapter. 
 
The chapter provides a discussion of the necessary conditions for a proper functioning of 
conditional commitments as incentives launched by enthusiastic countries. The analysis 
utilises Helland et al.’s (2015) framework of such conditions. Their experimental research 
concludes that conditional commitments might enhance climate change cooperation and has 
the potential of turning the dilemma game into a coordination game. But conditional 
commitments do not fully solve the collective action problem that typically threatens 
mitigation efforts and actors seem to only make limited contributions. The effect of 
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conditional commitments varies according to the leader’s leverage, the leader’s credibility 
and whether coordination among the followers succeeds. Lastly, I expand on Helland et al.’s 
(2015) framework by adding legitimacy as a fourth condition. The purpose of chapter four is 
thus to examine the conditions under which conditional commitments might work in order to 
gain knowledge about which settings that can induce climate change cooperation.  
 
4.1  Credibility  
First of all, Helland et al. (2015) maintain that a successful conditional commitment hinges 
upon its credibility. For a promise to be credible, the followers need to trust that the leader is 
willing and capable of upholding its promise in the event that the followers are able to deliver 
on the condition set by the leader. Furthermore, parties to the agreement must be able to trust 
that only actors committing themselves to the emissions reductions at hand will reap the 
benefits from this commitment and that every actor gains from the leader’s enhanced policies 
(Hovi et al., 2015, p. 12). For a promise to be fully credible it has to be binding according to 
the authors, which is challenging in international climate cooperation with climate clubs 
being no exception. In this section I analyse the credibility of the EU’s 20-20-20 plan and 
assess the forms of contingency proposed by Victor (2011). 
 
4.1.1 European Climate Leadership and Political Will 
Focusing on specific conditional commitments in the field of climate change mitigation, the 
EU’s 20-20-20 policy plan did not manage to bring about any considerable emission 
reductions. Why? In the next two sections I outline key aspects of EU’s climate and energy 
package for 2020 and examine to what extent the conditional commitment was perceived as 
credible. 
 
Early in 2007, the European Council promoted quantified emissions reduction targets in order 
to reach its objective of keeping the global average temperature below 2°C (Council, 2007). 
The proposal was included in “Europe 2020”, the EU’s 10-year strategy launched by the 
European Commission 3rd of March, 2010 (European Commission, 2015). In the climate 
policy strategy, the EU made a conditional commitment of reducing own GHG emissions by 
30 % (compared to 1990 levels) within the year 2020 provided that other developed countries 
followed suit (European Commission, 2007; Council, 2007). The EU nevertheless committed 
to a 20 % emissions reduction in the event its conditional promise was not responded to. 
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Additionally, the EU stated that they would increase energy efficiency by 20 % and aimed at 
a renewable energy share of at least 20 %. The Commission stated that they would achieve 
their goal partly through the EU’s emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) and by implementing 
a carbon capture and geological storage policy (CCS). In addition to the measures proposed 
by the Commission, the goals have been restructured into national objectives for each EU 
member state. As a condition for raising their target to 30 %, the EU expected that developed 
countries as a group reduced their emissions by 25 to 40 % by 2020 whereas developing 
countries as a group should set their reduction targets at 15-30 % by 2020 (Council, 2009). 
The conditions for the conditional commitment have not been met considering that no new 
climate agreement with binding emissions reductions has been agreed upon. It is worth 
mentioning that the EU’s climate and energy policy for 2030 does not contain any 
conditional commitments. However, the targets have been raised to 40 % for emissions 
reduction and 27 % for energy efficiency and renewables (Council, 2014). 
 
When launching its 20-20-20 plan, some argued that the EU managed to close a gap that had 
previously existed between the EU’s international commitments and its implementation of 
ambitious European climate policies (Oberthür and Kelly, 2008, p. 39). Arguably, the climate 
policies implemented by the EU in the 1990s were largely founded in a self-interested desire 
to strengthen and develop its foreign policy (Skodvin and Andresen, 2006, p. 22). In short, 
the EU’s attempts to establish itself as a climate leader after the U.S. withdrawal from the 
Kyoto Protocol entailed significant political benefits and little economic costs. Still, EU 
attempts to encourage states to join the Kyoto Protocol did not succeed. First of all, the 
ambitions of the Kyoto protocol had been drastically lowered from the initial outline and 
secondly the EU did not manage to induce the United States and other major emitters to 
reciprocate. In fact, the EU failed to meet its own Kyoto targets. However, with the new 
climate and energy package and an increased focus on providing a collective good, the EU 
has seemingly adopted a directional leadership style. Directional leadership can be defined as 
unilateral action, either “by influencing other parties’ incentives by making the first move” or 
“by demonstrating the pre-eminence of particular solution alternatives” (Skodvin and 
Andresen, 2006, p. 14). With its climate and energy package for 2020 the EU has indeed 
demonstrated a willingness to take on ambitious mitigation policies despite high economic 
costs. Their new directional leadership style has nevertheless not managed to induce other 
actors to sufficiently reduce their emissions. It seems that followers did not trust that the EU 
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was capable of upholding its promise. The next section probes into possible causes for this 
perception. 
 
4.1.2 Barriers for Domestic Implementation 
Besides political will, Underdal et al. (2012) introduce barriers for domestic implementation 
as another factor affecting the credibility of a conditional commitment. The authors have 
assessed under what conditions a conditional commitment by the EU can successfully induce 
the United States, China, India or Japan to follow suit. Involving these states in mitigation 
efforts is pivotal as their total GHG emissions account for three fifths of global emissions. 
Underdal et al. (2012) examine how a state’s mitigation costs are affected by emissions 
reductions carried out by other actors (see section 4.4). This effect is measured by simulating 
the changes in welfare if one of the actors move from their business-as-usual baseline policy 
to an enhanced policy as outlined in a conditional commitment. Different domestic sectors 
are not equally affected by a state’s mitigation policies and so the marginal abatement costs 
(MAC) 13 are not proportionately distributed across the various industries. This is relevant for 
explaining situations where a state refrains from implementing the enhanced policy line as 
demanded in a conditional commitment even though it would increase national welfare. 
Industries that have not been imposed MACs under the baseline policy line suffer the 
economic costs of an enhanced policy line and establishment of a global emissions-trading 
system. These industries are often in a position to lobby and pressure the government to stick 
to its baseline policies instead of implementing the enhanced policies as agreed to in a 
conditional commitment.  
 
In the case of the EU’s 20-20-20 plan, European energy producers and power-intensive 
industries managed to exert enough pressure throughout the legislation process to avoid the 
inclusion of specific sectors in the emissions reductions policies. Followers thus have reason 
to fear that these industries might similarly impede the EU reaching its enhanced policy 
target (Underdal et al., 2012, p. 484). The powerful lobbying position of these industries thus 
strongly harms the credibility of any conditional commitment made by the EU. What is more, 
putting the 30 % target into practice conflicted with the interests of a range of member states 
that together could block implementation with their Council votes. The Eastern European 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Marginal abatement costs is a term associated with environmental economics. In brief, MACs are the costs 
for ”eliminating an additional unit of emissions” (Morris et al.,2012, p. 327). 
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countries protested most heavily against the enhanced policy goal as they felt it would harm 
EU competitiveness and their power production, which is largely based on fossil fuels.  
 
Yet, these domestic indifferences do not necessarily have to weaken the credibility of future 
conditional commitments made by the EU as it is an institution capable of redistributing 
wealth among its member states. It could in fact compensate the Eastern European countries 
for potential losses in competitiveness and welfare. In this respect, for a future conditional 
commitment to function properly the EU would perhaps need to introduce side-payments to 
certain member countries. Overall, I would argue that the EU could have increased their 
chances of success if they had combined their conditional commitment with side-payments. 
However, it is worth noting that powerful economic sectors within the EU might still be able 
to sway these governments towards vetoing ambitious GHG emissions reduction targets. 
 
Putnam’s (1988) two-level game perspective is relevant for analysing how the international 
and national levels interact in negotiation processes. Bargaining at the international level 
depends on specific powerful interests at the national level. In turn, these interests affect 
countries’ capability of taking the lead or of following another state’s lead in mitigation 
efforts. The societal distribution of the costs and benefits of entering a conditional 
commitment for the country in question is a highly relevant factor.  For this reason, a leader’s 
attempt to induce other countries to reduce their emissions must be directed towards domestic 
constituents with veto power. It is precisely this line of reasoning Victor (2011) incorporates 
into his argument on why climate clubs remain a feasible alternative to global climate 
negotiations that merely introduce void targets that can be agreed on at the international level 
but are not attuned to domestic constituents.   
 
4.1.3 Climate Accession Deals 
The EU’s 20-20-20 policy failed to induce followers to respond positively. The discussion on 
the EU’s conditional commitment suggests that the promise of a 30 % reduction was not 
perceived as credible enough, largely due to domestic pressure from powerful industries that 
would experience considerable economic losses in the event that EU acted on it’s promise. 
This section looks into the credibility of Victor’s CAD model. Arguably, Victor’s (2011, p. 
247) concept of Climate Accession Deals (CADs) provides a more general model of how 
credible conditional commitments can be installed in a club setting. With its many veto 
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points, the EU’s decision process is not representative for other potential club members. The 
conditional commitments are adjusted to every club member’s capabilities and interests and 
the form of contingency differs from case to case. The idea is that club members provide 
different offers of technology, favourable conditions of trade and investment and linkages to 
emissions trading schemes among other possible club goods (Victor, 2011, p. 261). The 
offers made by reluctant nations could be combined with demands for external assistance, 
e.g. side-payments. Overall, Victor adopts a more holistic take on how contingency should be 
incorporated in a climate club and envisions club goods as part of the negotiations on 
conditional commitments. Victor envisions governments launching these bids to gain access 
to the climate club, as they have the best knowledge about which policies that can actually be 
implemented. It thus increases the chances of implementation and enhances the credibility of 
such conditional commitments.  It differs from the EU’s conditional commitments in the 
sense that a leader does not set a condition that others should join. Instead, each country 
applying for membership negotiates their entry conditions with existing club members. 
Conditional commitments can thus be viewed as a formalisation of the entry conditions 
agreed to by each member country. Still, Weischer et al. (2012, p. 191) underscore that 
members should agree on a “shared vision”, more specifically long-term ambitious goals. 
These could be targets for emissions reductions, energy efficiency, shares of renewable 
energy, or setting a cap on number of fossil fuel subsidies (Weischer et al., 2012, p. 191). It is 
essential that the entry conditions “strike the balance between leaving participation open to a 
large enough number of countries for the club to have an impact and setting some standards 
that ensure that the club actually encourages more ambition” (Weischer et al., 2012, p. 191). 
Section 5.1.2. examines specific challenges associated with doing so.  
 
The CAD model opens up for many different forms of conditional commitments. For 
countries having problems with implementing climate policies with long- term effects, the 
solution might be time-limited conditional commitments with an offer to top up. Such 
agreements could be crafted similarly to the EU’s 20-20-20 plan (Victor, 2011, p. 246). 
States with fairly new political institutions belongs to this group, as their governments may 
not be in an authoritative position to introduce targets for the next 50 years. For countries 
such as the United States facing a slow and complicated legislative process fraught with a 
range of veto possibilities, the form of contingency should be different. U.S. ratification and 
implementation of international agreements is a circumstantial ordeal.  The president is in a 
position to negotiate agreements but needs the “advice and consent” of the Senate, which 
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requires a two-thirds majority in the Senate to ratify them (Bang and Skodvin, 2014, p. 86). 
The implementation of the agreement furthermore depends on the Congress because the 
provisions of the international agreement need to be instituted as new federal legislation, 
often referred to as “enabling legislation” (Bang & Skodvin, 2014, p. 86). In other words, 
international agreements face challenges at the ratification stage as well as in the process of 
law adaptation. However, at the end of this process the provisions have the same status as 
federal law, thus facilitating more effective domestic enforcement of the agreement’s 
provisions than in many other states. In a climate club the U.S. government could itself bid 
conditional offers of mitigation measures that better reflected the chances of ratification and 
implementation at home, thus making them more credible. One possible way of doing so 
might be to focus on direct regulation and state policies. According to Victor (2011, p. 11), 
these are areas where the United States have already made efforts of introducing more 
ambitious climate policies. 
 
Next, a central issue in regards to credible promises is assessment. Enthusiastic countries are 
proposed to lead by example and be open for reviews of their conditional commitments 
(Victor, 2011, p. 261). The idea behind reviews is to “shine a spotlight on which national 
policy proposals are the most credible and thus make it easier for governments to negotiate 
contingent deals” (Victor, 2011, p. 247). Additionally it simplifies enforcement. Victor’s 
suggestion resembles that of the “pledge and review” approach that the Japanese government 
promoted in the beginning of the 1990s (2011, p. 262). Unfortunately, Japan’s proposition 
was not properly acted upon partly because the Japanese government did not manage to 
demonstrate the utility of a pledge and review system. The concept stands in contrast with 
climate negotiations’ usual focus on targets and timetables. In short, the idea involves 
countries making pledges on specific emissions control measures for which they are subject 
to frequent reviews. Hence there are no major or enforceable repercussions for not complying 
with the pledges but by not fulfilling their stated efforts, states loose their good standing with 
the other parties to the agreement (Tingley and Tomz, 2014, p. 364). 
 
The Copenhagen accord built on the pledge-and-review concept but failed to establish an 
institutional setting that could facilitate cooperation on the various countries’ pledges. 
According to Victor, CADs induce countries to raise their efforts because the pledges made 
by each government are collected and bargained upon in larger package deals. He contrasts 
these with the CDM, which functioned only as a “one-off deal(s) with no vision for the 
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future, creat(ing) perverse incentives for reluctant nations to avoid sensible policies, 
including putting a positive price on carbon” (Victor, 2011, p. 259). Furthermore, CADs 
would not be prone to the same enforcement problems as the voluntary Copenhagen pledges 
(see section 2.4) because the promises governments make in the transition process towards 
club membership are eventually tied up to the access of club benefits.  
 
Overall, under the right circumstances a club approach can increase the credibility of a 
conditional commitment because the pledges made by each government are more attuned to 
the capabilities of the state to deliver on the emissions reductions targets. This is partly 
because the interests of certain sectors and domestic disputes are already dealt with. In this 
way, the followers are in a better position to trust that the leader is both willing and capable 
of keeping its promise. However, it all depends on the state launching the promise. 
Examining the failure of the EU to incentivise followers by its conditional commitment 
suggests that the CAD model is more suitable for guiding similar endeavours within a climate 
club. Future conditional commitments launched by the EU should be better fitted to each key 
actor instead of simply outlining one target for developing countries and one target for 
industrialised countries. By combining incentives tailored to each follower, the prospects for 
success would improve significantly. Most notably, side- payments can help solve domestic 
political indifferences that may threaten the credibility of a commitment.  
 
4.2  Leverage 
A second condition affecting the ability of conditional agreements to produce favourable 
outcomes concerns the leader’s leverage (Helland et al., 2015). In order to induce followers 
to reduce their emissions, the promise must make reducing emissions worthwhile in terms of 
cost-benefit analyses. In effect, the leader’s leverage depends on the balance of the leader’s 
promised contribution and what is demanded in return from the followers. When the leader 
demands substantial contributions from the followers, the leader’s contribution also need to 
be of considerable size in order to induce other countries to reduce emissions. In either case, 
the leader needs to be sufficiently resourceful to be capable of launching a significant 
promise to its followers (Helland et al., 2015). Simulations performed by Underdal et al. 
(2012, p. 485) indicate that the United States is the main actor least sensitive to mitigation 
carried out by others. The result suggests that United States gains more from implementing 
its baseline policies than introducing its enhanced policy even if all the other main actors do 
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the same. If this proves to be the case it might be difficult or even impossible for a leader to 
introduce a promise that could effectively alter the cost-benefit analysis of the United States 
while simultaneously not jeopardising the welfare of its own citizens. According to 
simulations carried out by Underdal et al. (2012, p. 485), EU’s conditional promise of 
reducing emissions by 30 % would have to be modified to a 65 % reduction before the United 
States could start benefitting from taking part in the conditional commitment. If their 
simulations turn out to be correct a depiction of real life climate negotiations, it is crucial to 
install club activities and policies that might generate sufficient benefits to the United States. 
It must be kept in mind that enthusiastic countries are also dependent on access to significant 
club goods as a reward for willingly using own resources to combat global warming. 
 
4.2.1 The Threat of Carbon Leakage  
In the event that the leader only has enough leverage to induce a handful of followers to 
participate, main actors that choose not to respond to the conditional commitment face 
incentives for increasing their emissions. This process is called carbon leakage, or emissions 
leakage, and are essential for explaining attempts of climate change mitigation that end up 
producing an outcome completely opposite of what is aimed for. Also, the risks of carbon 
leakage weaken incentives for installing green technology. Thus, carbon leakage ultimately 
poses a serious threat to the provision of mitigation as a global public good.  
 
Carbon leakage consists of two different economic mechanisms (Maria & Werf, 2008, p. 56). 
The first is the terms-of-trade effect, which happens because states that have introduced 
emissions reduction measures face more costly productions of energy intensive goods and 
become more sensitive to imports from states that still base their production on large GHG 
emissions. As a consequence, prices of such goods rise and non-participants to the climate 
agreement gain competitive advantages in the international market.  The second mechanism 
is called the energy-market effect and relates to the slump in carbon prices due to lowered 
demand of fossil fuels in countries that implement reduction measures. It then becomes 
beneficial for states that are not subject to emissions reduction policies to substitute other 
energy sources with fossil fuels. The latter effect benefits net importers of fossil fuels, while 
harming net exporters. An example of the energy-market effect is the repercussions of the 
U.S. shale gas-revolution on the European market (McMahon, 2012). Due to the growing 
“fracking” industry in the United States and a correspondingly decreased demand for coal at 
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home, cheap fossil fuels are exported to Europe, where it ousts the use of clean natural gas. 
Also worth mentioning are the growing concerns for health issues and environmental 
damages caused by the production of shale gas, among them methane emissions. Some 
researchers have even described methane as more aggravating for global warming in a short- 
term perspective than CO2 (Hovland, 2011). Others oppose this view by arguing that fracking 
may become compatible with mitigation efforts provided that the production methods 
improve. Data released by the International Energy Agency (IEA) show decreasing U.S. 
emissions as a result of shale gas displacing coal and serve as another argument in favour of 
using this type of energy (Wooldridge, 2012). Nonetheless, by focusing on shale gas, energy 
productions that are not dependent on fossils at all might be under- prioritised (Seip, 2013). 
Overall, both of the economic mechanisms associated with carbon leakage contribute to a 
global increase of GHG emissions. Carbon leakage can thus indirectly be the result of 
unilateral action taken by a leader that does not have enough leverage to induce others to 
follow.  
 
The challenges associated with carbon leakage add to the importance of setting up a climate 
club with club goods that are significantly attractive for new club members and thus 
counteract carbon leakage by broadening participation. By doing so, a climate club would 
increase the leverage of its conditional commitments and thus induce reluctant countries to 
join. Indeed, Maria & Werf (2008, p. 57) hold “directed technical change” as crucial in order 
to address the terms-of-trade effect. Barrett and Stavins (2003) propose trade instruments, 
such as a border tax, to prevent emissions leakage but recognize the many obstacles towards 
including such instruments in a climate agreement. In Chapter 5 I investigate how members 
of a climate club can collaborate on technology transfers. I also discuss the possibilities of 
institutionalising mutually advantageous terms of trade and investment as club goods. 
Additionally, the chapter provides a discussion of under which conditions trade instruments 
can be used as sticks.   
 
4.3  Coordination 
Helland et al. (2015) introduce coordination among followers as a third condition moderating 
conditional commitments’ ability to enhance cooperation. The condition is closely connected 
to each actor’s response to the leader’s promise and its chosen contribution. Difficulties in 
fulfilling the third condition are held to be the main reason why conditional commitments 
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alone are incapable of solving the collective action problem. Coordination naturally depends 
on which state that would hold the role as leader. Underdal et al. (2012) focus their study on 
key actors to include in a conditional commitment, namely the EU, China, India, Japan and 
the United States. They all benefit from emissions reduction measures implemented by one of 
the other major emitters as it decreases concentrations of GHGs globally. In order for the 
conditional commitment to take effect and induce actors to implement their enhanced 
policies, it is essential that the followers are able to coordinate their efforts and meet the 
condition set by the leader. However, the condition can be met in several different ways. The 
size of an actor’s contribution does not only depend on the leader’s promise but also on the 
contributions given by others. If the leader outlines the average follower contribution it might 
be rational for actors to free ride and hope that the contributions made by others are sufficient 
for the leader to implement his promise. Similarly, the incentive to free ride can be present if 
the leader only provide a minimum contribution for followers as the actors would lack 
information and reassurance that others also follow up on the leader’s promise.  
 
Helland et al. (2015) argues that successful coordination between followers partly depends on 
whether the benefits of the public goods provision are equally shared. This is usually not the 
case and has resulted in states advocating conflicting normative principles about how the 
burden sharing of global mitigation measures should be set up. Scholars have argued that the 
varying contribution norms are applied by states as part of their own self-serving bias. 
Bernauer, Gampfer and Landis (2014, p.46) list a range of principles related to mitigation: 
individual equality; economic equality; national grandfathering; historical responsibility; 
current responsibility; historical economic benefits from emissions; economic capacity; and 
cost-benefit analysis.  The authors examine to what extent public support for a state’s climate 
policies depends on principles of fair burden sharing. Surveys indicate that both normative 
and utilitarian (economic) considerations matter in this respect. Generally speaking, the 
industrialized countries would be allocated the biggest share of the burden regardless of the 
principle applied but because the outcomes vary to some degree these principles tend to cause 
major and insurmountable disputes during climate change negotiations. However, there are 
some cases where the outcome differs substantially for some countries. Most notably, the 
economic consequences for China vary considerably according to whether an agreement is 
based on historical or current emissions. Also, per capita emissions matter in this respect as 
discussed later on.   
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Emissions trading is a proposed mechanism for equalizing the costs of mitigation among 
followers. Underdal et al. (2012, p. 481) envision a ”regime of perfect coordination” as a 
situation where the major emitters all adopt their enhanced policies and cooperate through an 
international emissions trading scheme. They argue that through emissions trading states are 
able to share the marginal abatement costs and thus increase their efficiency gains, thereby 
making it less expensive for actors to deliver on their outlined policies. In fact, it seems a 
state only benefits from implementing its enhanced policies if all the other actors reciprocate 
and marginal abatement costs are equalized. However, the discussion in section 5.1.3 reveals 
that emissions trading alone might be insufficient for equalizing MACs and in fact involves a 
global shift in wealth. Furthermore, Underdal et al. (2012) recognize the political challenges 
of including both the United States and China in a regime like this. The dispute between these 
two major emitters about how to tackle global warming demonstrates how self-serving bias 
influence the norms states invoke. Previous climate negotiations have been marked by 
disputes between China and the United States concerning the size of each state’s contribution 
to mitigation efforts. Even though the United States is characterised as an enthusiastic 
country, it still would have to coordinate its efforts with other followers to meet a leader’s 
condition, provided it does not itself take on the leading role. For this reason the next section 
looks into the prospects for bringing together American and Chinese interests.     
 
4.3.1 Coordinating U.S. and Chinese Mitigation Efforts 
Climate change cooperation has continually been hampered by the United States and China’s 
inabilities to agree on the terms for their reciprocal relationship. Their indifferences are 
equally demanding for the prospects of a conditional commitment succeeding, both in terms 
of the two states coordinating their efforts in order to respond to a leader’s promise and with 
regards to one of them taking on the leading role. The Byrd Hagel resolution, as mentioned in 
chapter 2, makes the United States’ mitigation efforts contingent on the behaviour of other 
states (Senate Resolution 98, 1997). The resolution clearly states that the United States shall 
not ratify the Kyoto protocol or any other agreement obligating the country to reduce own 
emissions unless other major developing countries do the same. Their stance is rooted in 
economic considerations and channels a fear that large emissions reductions that are not 
reciprocated by major developing countries will be unbeneficial for the competitiveness of 
American industries (Asselt and Brewer, 2010, p. 42).  
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Similarly, China argues along the same lines: namely that they will not commit to any 
binding emissions reduction targets before the United States has agreed to implement such 
measures (Hovi et al., 2013). The Chinese government has time and again been reluctant to 
agree to any quantified emissions reductions targets. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
tends to be cautious about promising the Chinese people concrete outcomes if they are not 
completely confident that they are able to deliver on such targets, as this might jeopardize 
their political legitimacy (Conrad, 2012, p. 443).  Keeping in mind that China is currently 
responsible for 29 % of global CO2 emissions and that the U.S. share amounts to 15 % (with 
numbers constantly changing), it is crucial that both countries join a potential climate club in 
order for the organisation to achieve any significant emissions reductions14 (Olivier et al., 
2014).  
 
The deadlock in U.S.-China relations has raised concerns about any climate change 
agreement being able to, whether directly or indirectly, solve these indifferences about fair 
burden sharing and historical responsibility. The changing pattern of China’s energy 
consumption is a relevant aspect of the debate on which norms that should guide the 
distribution of responsibilities. Indeed, China’s changing energy use the previous decade 
suggests that the country’s role as an advocate for “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” for Annex I and Annex II countries is out-dated (Conrad, 2012, p. 442; 
United Nations, 1992, p. 2). Conrad sees China as having developed a “dual status as a 
developing country and a major emitter” (2012, p. 454). China surpassed the United States as 
the world’s largest energy consumer in 2009 and data also show that the energy use per 
capita has increased to the same level as the global average use per capita (IEA, 2010). Still, 
Chinese citizens’ energy use is only one third of the average OECD per capita consumption. 
China can thus be inclined to advocate historical responsibility and emissions per capita as 
guiding principles for fair burden-sharing.  
 
On the other hand, China has followed up its increased energy use with ambitious domestic 
climate policies. China’s change of course is motivated by a range of different factors: 
vulnerability to climate change, energy security, international reputation and most 
prominently a focus on finding new models of economic growth (Conrad, 2012, p. 438). This 
is evident in a range of national programs and strategies that outline political goals of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The global CO2 emissions data are collected by the PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency for 
the year 2013. 
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increasing renewable energy use and energy efficiency. By doing so, China becomes 
increasingly self-sufficient in its energy supply, which improves energy security. 
Furthermore, it is a politically valuable goal as China becomes less dependent on fossil fuels 
from other states. In addition, the Chinese government has recognized increasing GHG 
emissions as a serious threat to public health and security, especially for children (Wong, 
2013b). These issues have lowered people’s trust in the government and many choose to 
emigrate for the sake of their children’s health. The largest cities are ranked at the world top 
when it comes to levels of air pollution (Wong, 2013a). Conrad (2012) holds the main reason 
for China’s altered policies to be the issue’s threat towards economic growth and social 
stability, making mitigation a political priority for the CCP. The party’s legitimacy rests upon 
their ability to secure prosperity and good living conditions to large parts of the population. 
Overall, the social, economic and political benefits of transitioning to a low-carbon economy 
seem to have outweighed the costs of implementing such climate policies. 
 
However, recent developments suggest at least moderate progress for the U.S.-China 
relationship in mitigation matters. First of all, the newly founded U.S.-China Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue (S&ED) signals prospects for cooperation (U.S. Department of State, 
2014). The working group conducting its work was established in 2013 and facilitates 
cooperation on emissions reductions from heavy- duty and other vehicles; carbon capture, 
utilization and storage; and collection of GHG emissions data among other issues. Overall, 
the dialogue promotes information sharing and technology exchange between the two super 
powers. The U.S. Government coined the emissions reduction targets agreed upon by 
President Obama and President Xi Jinping 11th November 2014 as a “milestone in the United 
States- China relationship” (Kerry, 2014). Despite the fact that this is the first we have seen 
of China introducing quantified targets for their emissions reductions, U.S. implementation of 
the agreement is politically infeasible. As has been established, the party political tug of war 
in Congress to pass bills reduces the chances of translating Obama’s promises into policies. 
What is more, with only two years left in office it is unlikely that Obama’s successor will 
follow up on this ten-year commitment (Aftenposten, 2014). To demonstrate, the current 
Senate majority leader, Mitch McConnell, proclaimed that the Republicans intend to give 
Obama’s energy politics tough resistance (O’Keefe et al., 2014). Even though the Republican 
Party is not in a position to block the United States- China agreement altogether, there are 
certain ways to block implementation of policies introduced by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), which put limits on GHG emissions from power-plants. According to some 
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sources, a potential way of doing so is by “passing language that would give states the option 
of not complying with the EPA mandate until litigation on the issue is resolved, or that would 
bar federal authorities from enforcing the rule” (O’Keefe et al., 2014).  
 
Victor’s classification of the United States as an enthusiastic country and China as a reluctant 
one can be questioned, as neither countries have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Victor defends 
his categorization by arguing that the United States has shown greater efforts to address 
global warming, demonstrated by ambitious climate policies introduced at state level. The 
lack of commitment to binding emissions targets is pinned to the deadlock in federal policy-
making (Victor, 2011, p. 11). Different from the United States, Victor (2011, p. 11) labels 
China as a reluctant country because it does not  “put global warming high on the list of 
national concerns, (it) won’t do much to control emissions except where those efforts 
coincide with other national goals”. Although China has partly lived up to this image in COP 
negotiations, addressing the issue of climate change has now become of great national 
concern. The Chinese government has also introduced quantified targets for their emissions 
reductions through the S&ED. However, targets need to be implemented and this is where a 
club approach comes in. A climate club can provide better opportunities for China to 
participate in global mitigation efforts while simultaneously looking after national priorities. 
To illustrate, China’s need for green technology collaborations and expertise from developed 
countries make it in their interest to participate in a climate club (Conrad, 2012, p. 441). 
Indeed, involving China in a climate club can “alleviate developed countries’ doubts 
regarding China’s willingness and capability to comply with commitments” (Conrad, 2012, 
p. 455).  
 
To sum up, it is crucial that followers coordinate their efforts in order to meet the condition 
set by the leader and hence hold the leader to its promise of topping up its contribution. In 
this section I directed my attention to the possibilities of coordinating American and Chinese 
mitigation efforts in a climate club because it is claimed to be one of the biggest obstacles for 
reaching a directly or indirectly effective climate agreement.  
 
4.4  Legitimacy 
In addition to the conditions introduced by Helland et al. (2015), I look into legitimacy as a 
fourth condition for conditional commitments’ ability to successfully motivate reluctant 
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countries to join in on mitigation efforts. Political legitimacy refers to the level of support 
from political elites and the public. In the end, the stability and longevity of a climate club 
depends on high levels of support. Even though the main idea of establishing a climate club is 
based on an open membership-policy and broad participation, its first stages would 
necessarily bear the markings of a fragmented, minilateral regime consisting of a few 
powerful actors. In this section I examine in which ways a lack of political legitimacy might 
jeopardize the feasibility and stability of conditional commitments.  
 
Gampfer (2014, p. 98) lists three reasons why a climate club might lack political legitimacy. 
First of all, he argues that a club approach is not legally legitimate in the same sense as the 
UNFCCC process. The UN is recognized by the international community to hold a prominent 
position in cooperation on global issues such as global warming. Several existing clubs, e.g. 
the G20 and the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF), have emerged as a 
supplement to the UN process (Andersen, 2014, p. 163). In fact, in MEF discussions 
members continually refer to the UNFCCC principles. These forums uphold the perception of 
the UNFCCC as “the main and legitimate body for dealing with issues of climate change” 
(Andersen, 2014, p. 164). Scholars disagree on which relationship a future, transformational 
climate club should establish with the UN. For Victor (2011) it is crucial that a climate club 
is not part of the UN framework because he sees the organization as holding an unmerited 
position in this policy area. If the club approach were to be carried out within the structures 
of the UN it would be compromised from the beginning and restrained from outlining the 
most suited strategy. Weischer et al. (2012) advocate a way in between, namely the 
possibility of starting out cooperation in a smaller group and then ‘bringing in’ the strategy to 
the UN afterwards.  
 
Secondly, Gampfer (2014) maintains that a climate club would score low on legitimacy by 
excluding non-members from the discussion on the appropriate measures for halting global 
warming. This argument does not take into account that a climate club can be based on an 
open-membership principle and designed to involve as many states as possible by providing 
sufficient incentives for membership. Indeed, Victor (2011) argues that broad membership is 
a necessary condition for effective climate cooperation. Including as many states as possible 
brings legitimacy to the project, together with shared norms and standards. In a dynamic club, 
states choose to join and take part in the debate. If a state nevertheless stays on the outside of 
the club, it would still benefit from the club’s contribution to decreased global warming.  
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Third, Gampfer (2014, p. 98) argues that during the first stages of institutionalization the 
project might suffer from “domestic implementation obstacles” unless the conditional 
commitment receives support from the general public. In fact, surveys conducted in France, 
Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States demonstrate how public support for a 
climate agreement can vary substantially according to costs and distribution, participation 
and enforcement (Bechtel & Scheve, 2013). Public support decreases proportionally to the 
number of participants in an agreement. It is reasonable to assume that citizens expect 
agreements with few parties to be less effective. In other words, the level of support hinges 
upon the policy outcomes of the climate club. If the club fails to encourage other states to 
join, it suffers from a low level of effectiveness and the public most likely feels that the costs 
of participating outweigh the benefits. To demonstrate, a small group of states would be 
subject to high economic costs for taking action in mitigation matters, putting their industries 
at a comparative disadvantage. The main idea is that the public is able to live with a certain 
degree of unequal burden sharing and higher costs if the club actually brings about effective 
mitigation. Bechtel and Scheve’s (2013) work confirms this finding. The strong linkages 
between legitimacy, public support and effectiveness underline the necessity of focusing 
attention on which countries a climate club should entice to join.  
 
Some scholars tend to focus on economic calculations to answer the question of how many 
and which countries necessarily have to be part of a climate agreement in order for it to 
effectively mitigate climate change. Based on emissions data from 2013 there are six major 
emitters that would be key actors to include in a climate club. In total these countries were 
accountable for 70 % of global CO2 emissions and consisted of China (29%), the United 
States (15%), the EU-28 (11%), India (6%), Russia (5%) and Japan (4%) (see figure 4.1) 
(Olivier et al., 2014). In the event that a climate club would bring its ambitions back to the 
UN framework, including China and India as representatives for G77 is of high political 
value (Underdal, 2014).  
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Figure 4.1: Global CO2 emissions per country from fossil fuel-use and cement production.15 The figure shows 
each country’s share of global emissions in 2013. 
Source: Olivier et al. (2014). 
 
Overall I would argue that the results of Gampfer’s study are tainted by his assumption that a 
climate club would be static and his failure to include a politically legitimate dynamic club 
model as a possible choice in his survey. Following this line of reasoning, it is natural to 
assume that states that oppose other countries establishing a climate club simply dread the 
possibility of being induced to join and undertake unwanted emissions reductions. If this 
proves to be the case then setting up effective incentives is imperative. Otherwise, the 
outcome is merely a fragmented and small-n agreement. Furthermore, the results from 
Gampfer’s study is not that pivotal for the overall prospects of an effective climate club as it 
fails to include conditional commitments as possible incentives and thus neglect to take into 
account how such instruments would complement the use of club goods. Low public support 
seems to be a bigger issue but seeing as the survey is conducted among the American public 
some aspects are overlooked. First of all, as a major economy the United States is necessarily 
not as motivated by club goods and the potential use of sanctions (both as a member and as a 
non-member) as many other prospective club members would be. I would argue that a more 
reasonable concern for non-members, which could create problems for the club’s political 
legitimacy, would be the club’s potential negative spillovers into other fields of multilateral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Emissions and removals from land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) are not included due to large 
annual variability (Olivier et al., 2014, p. 6).   
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cooperation. I discuss negative spillovers and possible solutions in section 5.2.1. 
 
4.5 Summary 
The discussion in this chapter may be summarised in four main points.  
 
First, I introduced political will and barriers to domestic implementation faced by the leader 
as important factors affecting the credibility of conditional commitments. Studying the EU’s 
20-20 by 2020 policy target revealed that despite the EU’s political willingness to take costly 
mitigation action, the leader seemed to be promising more than it was able to deliver. There 
is reason to believe that a CAD model could give rise to more credible conditional 
commitments than the EU’s 20-20 by 2020 policy plan. I found that the promises made by 
each country in their respective CADs had better chances of being enforced if systems for 
assessment were in place and the promises were tied to the access of club goods. 
 
The second condition concerned the leader’s leverage. Results from previously conducted 
experimental research suggest that it is highly problematical to find a leader with enough 
leverage to motivate the United States to implement their enhanced policy line. Furthermore, 
I argued that a conditional commitment made by a leader that lacks leverage could ultimately 
produce perverse incentives for increasing emissions, a phenomenon known as carbon 
leakage. I found that club goods might under the right circumstances counteract carbon 
leakage by broadening participation. 
 
The third condition entailed that followers have to coordinate their efforts to meet the 
leader’s conditions. Coordinating American and Chinese mitigation efforts is a big challenge 
but a climate club would be in a better position to bring together their interests if the club 
benefits are attractive enough for both countries. I presented recent developments in China 
that have helped put climate change mitigation on the national political agenda. I argued that 
these events have made the country less reluctant to international cooperation on global 
warming.  
 
The fourth condition dealt with the public support for and political legitimacy of conditional 
commitments and a climate club overall. I found that legitimacy is not an important condition 
for successfully applying conditional commitments as incentives. However, the political 
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legitimacy of a club can run into some problems if the club causes negative spillovers into 
other multilateral efforts to tackle climate change, which would affect non-members.   
 
Overall, the main findings in chapter four suggest that the success of applying conditional 
commitments as incentives for reluctant countries is not only contingent on specific 
conditions but also depends on the use of club goods.  Chapter five examines which 
conditions that pertain to the employment of club goods.    
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5 Club Goods 
The second part of my analysis aims to investigate under what conditions club goods can 
induce reluctant countries to follow suit and contribute to global climate change mitigation. 
Club goods can take many shapes and be directed towards a range of different areas. Hence 
the chapter does not provide a full and detailed account of all the possible goods a climate 
club can produce, nor is it a comprehensive legal analysis that manages to address every 
potential obstacle. Instead, it gives us a better understanding of how club goods should be 
institutionalized in order to induce non-members to join the climate club. The analysis 
examines the economic and political considerations taken by politicians when crafting and 
implementing climate policies. This knowledge can be utilized as a starting point for finding 
suitable club goods and being aware of troubling issues that need to be dealt with along the 
way.  
 
Although previous literature has produced an extensive range of club good proposals, I 
mainly concentrate on three areas that have received an especially great deal of attention: 
emissions trading, collaboration on green technologies and trade-related measures. The 
argument is structured according to Weischer et al.’s (2012) four main conditions for 
successfully functioning club goods. The authors envision each country crafting their own 
“package of incentives” according to such conditions (Weischer et al., 2012, p. 91). Instead 
of performing country-specific analyses of this kind I probe into challenges that enthusiastic 
and reluctant countries are most likely to face in attempts of fulfilling the four conditions.  
 
First of all, club benefits have to be significant. In this section I assess whether or not 
emissions trading as a club good is capable of meeting the first condition. Due to several 
political factors it seems unlikely that a club would be able to establish an international 
carbon market that works as intended. Instead, it is reasonable to assume that club members 
would meddle with the market mechanisms and supplement emissions trading with a 
regulatory approach. Secondly, the club goods have to be accessible for members only. I term 
the second condition “exclusivity”. Issues of negative spillover complicate the process of 
finding club goods able to meet this condition. Thirdly, all members should benefit from 
being in the club. The discussion under this section is characterized by issues of aligning the 
interests of developed and developing countries in ways that are acceptable for club 
members. It touches upon the possibility of applying side-payments as a response to issues of 
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asymmetries among club members. And lastly, club goods need to be set up according to 
existing international law, most notably trade laws. There are different views about whether 
or not Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) facilitate transfers of green technologies from 
enthusiastic to reluctant countries. Arguably, collaboration on technology policies is more 
likely to ensure innovation in a climate club. Additionally, I have chosen to treat Weischer et 
al.’s (2012) focus on credibility as a fifth condition. Credibility is a central aspect of the 
debate on using trade restrictions as negative incentives in a club. Avoiding sanctions can be 
an attractive club good for non-members. 
 
Weischer et al. (2012) outline several potential club benefits a climate club might include. 
Similar to them, I focus on activities and agreements directly connected to reductions in GHG 
emissions. However, a climate club might also cooperate on duty-free market access for 
products that are not explicitly defined as low-carbon.  
 
5.1 Significance 
If a club good is significant enough it can alter the cost-benefit analysis of prospective 
members (Weischer et al., 2012, p. 187). Weischer et al. (2012) focus on economic benefits 
(related to jobs, investment and trade for instance) that are able to outweigh the costs of 
joining the climate club. Costs of club membership can take many forms. Hovi et al. (2015, p. 
16) propose setting up a “club fee”. In their case, members are required to spend 1 % of their 
GDP on mitigation measures. Hence, the composition of club goods would need to generate 
large enough economic benefits to compensate for the club fee and entice reluctant countries 
to join instead of staying on the outside of the club.  
 
I expand on Weischer et al.’s (2012) condition by also considering how club goods can 
generate political benefits that are significant enough. Indeed, there are large gaps between 
what is considered to be economically rational and what is politically feasible when it comes 
to outlining potential club goods. Take the example of emissions trading and carbon taxes. 
Many prominent scholars believe carbon taxes to be a more suitable, cost-efficient tool than 
emissions trading for addressing climate change (see Victor, 2011; Weitzman, 1974). Yet 
politicians time-and-again choose cap-and-trade schemes because they wish to retain the 
control over costs and benefits of specific mitigation measures. Due to re-election concerns, 
politicians want to remain on good terms with influential, well-organised societal groups and 
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seek to avoid climate policies that impose high costs on these blocs. Handing out permits to 
these groups and linking domestic emissions trading markets is a way of attending to such 
political priorities. Still, the prospects for creating a well-functioning international carbon 
market are grim because the very political reasons for choosing emissions trading over 
carbon taxes also convince politicians to meddle with the global carbon price. The result is 
hybrid systems; carbon markets combined with regulatory approaches. Thus, purely 
economic predictions of which club goods that produce the largest benefits do not necessarily 
fit the political reality.  
 
Throughout the section I concentrate on emissions trading as a proposed club good because 
several scholars (see Underdal et al., 2012; Weischer et al., 2012) have argued that linking 
domestic emissions trading systems entails significant benefits. The following sections 
indicate that this might not be the case. They also raise the issue of defining suitable entry 
conditions that do not compromise any of Weischer et al.’s (2012) four conditions.  
 
5.1.1 Potentially Significant Club Benefits Associated with Emissions 
Trading 
Emissions trading can in theory contribute positively to a state’s cost-benefit analysis because 
the marginal abatement costs are equally shared among members participating in a global 
trading scheme. In other words, emissions trading addresses the negative externalities of 
mitigation and encourages actors to “internalize(…) the social cost of carbon” (Chevallier, 
2013, p. 471). By linking emissions trading systems, the market for allowances grows, thus 
reducing the price volatility and bettering the liquidity of the market (Jaffe & Stavins, 2008, 
p. 10). The benefits from participating in emissions trading similarly increase. Jaffe & 
Stavins (2008, p. 10) claim that by linking markets, member states are able to shift focus 
from assignment of responsibility. With regards to the complex and heated debates about 
norms of fair burden- sharing, a chance to move past such disagreements cannot be 
overlooked. Club members can instead concentrate on meeting collective emissions goals 
cost-efficiently through market linkages. Lastly, as already mentioned, governments are often 
inclined to use emissions credits as a way of handing out benefits to powerful lobby 
organisations and societal groups without having to relocate funds from others (Victor, 2011, 
p. 67). Emissions credits can be characterised as new assets that are not already included in 
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the state budget. In comparison, carbon taxes have to be collected from citizens that in many 
countries distrust that the money allocated for mitigation measures are not spent elsewhere.  
 
However, it is worth noting that the potential costs and benefits of linking the various club 
members’ emissions trading schemes depend on the type of system and linkage. There are 
essentially two main systems of emissions trading: cap-and-trade systems and emission-
reduction-credit systems (Jaffe & Stavins, 2008, p.2). In a cap-and-trade system, actors are 
allocated specific caps on pollution relative to a definition of the maximum global emissions 
levels (Chevallier, 2013, p. 472). When the participants engage in trade of emissions permits 
the carbon price fluctuates according to the balance of supply and demand in the carbon 
market. Such trade systems are thus constructed by governments but not regulated by them. 
Due to price variations and volatility of allowance prices, the costs of participating in a cap-
and-trade system are highly uncertain. Through specific “cost-containment” measures policy-
makers can secure more flexibility for companies in meeting their commitments (Jaffe & 
Stavins, 2008, p. 3). Cap-and-trade systems that have incorporated these design elements give 
emitters the opportunity to bank allowances for the future, borrow from future permits and 
take part in offset provisions where participants can take part in emissions reduction efforts 
outside of the areas covered by the cap-and-trade system and still offset part of their 
emissions.   
 
For the second form of emissions trading, namely emissions-reduction-credit system, credits 
are granted according to certified emissions reductions (Jaffe & Stavins, 2008, p. 3). The 
CDM is the most prominent example of such systems. The two types of trading systems have 
similar features but in emissions-reduction-credit systems entities participate voluntarily. In 
these systems participants can earn credits in order to meet compliance requirements of other 
trading schemes. Despite the similarities of the two systems, using linkage of domestic ETS 
as an incentive for reluctant countries depends on what type of systems that are linked. Direct 
linkages between cap-and-trade systems can actually reduce governments’ ambitions with 
regards to setting future caps on emissions.  
 
5.1.2 Criteria for Club Membership and Effects on the Size of Club Goods 
An important aspect to examine are the risks of reducing the size of club goods by allowing 
countries with less stringent climate policy goals to join the club. Weischer et al. (2012, p. 
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192) taps into the very core of the debate: what “shared vision” should club members commit 
to in order to ensure transformational change while providing attractive economic benefits of 
membership? As discussed in section 4.1.3, there are a number of long-term targets club 
members could agree on through CAD negotiations. At the same time, it can be hard to find a 
middle ground between imposing standards that are too strict and standards that lack 
ambition. Entry conditions that are very stringent can deter key players with major markets 
from joining the club, which would result in smaller club benefits and consequently weaken 
the incentives for others to join. Similarly, too general club visions and membership criteria 
would not bring about an effective climate agreement.  The discussion on criteria for linking 
domestic emissions trading markets illustrates this dilemma. 
 
Flachsland et al. (2008) assess the potential of linking the EU ETS to other domestic markets. 
I apply their contribution to discuss possible criteria for linkages between other prospective 
club members as well. The authors propose taking such considerations at an early stage when 
setting up an international emissions trading market due to barriers for reforming systems at a 
later stage. They underline that the question of fair burden- sharing cannot be disregarded as 
a guiding principle for setting up linkages between domestic ETSs (Flachsland et al., 2008, p. 
25). Actors are expected to adopt climate policy goals in order to meet the regional emissions 
level dictated by fair burden- sharing rules. Without a coordination of long-term climate 
policy targets and consensus on the various responsibilities of member states, there are 
stronger incentives for countries to relax their caps in order to sell extra allowances in the 
system they have established a link to. Their work thus contradicts Jaffe and Stavins’ (2008, 
p. 10) view that club members can merely focus on cost-efficiency of emissions trading and 
not worry about the various members’ responsibilities. Flachsland et al. (2008, p. 25) list two 
other main concerns for enthusiastic countries that consider linking their ETS to reluctant 
countries without requiring the prospective club members to adopt specific ambitious targets 
for their emissions reduction levels. First of all, links to actors that fail to stick to their 
emissions budgets might jeopardise enthusiastic countries’ ability to deliver on present-day 
and future caps set to carry out their fair part of emissions reductions. Secondly, imagine that 
a country with ambitious climate goals establishes a linkage with another domestic trade 
market with less stringent targets. It might set a precedent for negotiations of club entry and 
prospective members’ access to club goods such as emissions trading. As a consequence it 
might become even harder to incentivise reluctant countries to participate in mitigation 
efforts. Flachsland et al.’s (2008, p. 25) example of the EU ETS demonstrate the inherent 
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problems of linking to a less ambitious partner:  “when linking unconditionally, the EU 
would compromise its credibility and thus bargaining power16 in other negotiations”.   
 
What about prospective club members that have adopted climate policy targets but not as 
stringent as the targets set by existing member states? In these cases a similar trade off exists 
between enticing new members to join and ensuring significant club goods with strong 
reputation effects and consequential efficiency gains. To demonstrate this dilemma, an 
enthusiastic country can choose to link its ETS to a new club member with less ambitious 
climate policies in the hope that the country will increase its ambitions as a result of joining 
the club. The main idea is that the new club member choose to take on similar caps as the 
more enthusiastic club founders at a later stage in order to hold on to the benefits of 
efficiency gains and reputation effects. The newly accepted member might be subject to a re-
assessment of its cap after some years of membership. Another option would be to introduce 
exchange rates between the various systems’ emissions credits. However, varying carbon 
prices across systems might reduce the efficiency gains of participating in emissions trading. 
If the very measures taken to include these countries reduce the efficiency gains, it might 
seriously reduce the club benefits associated with emissions trading. As a last point, 
Flachsland et al. (2008, p. 26) argue that a two-way linkage between countries that have 
significantly different strategic climate policy targets complicates potential linkages to third 
parties. It reduces the coherency of negotiations with other actors and blurs the advantages 
and costs of a third linkage. For a climate club with expectations of including new partners at 
a frequent rate, possible problems associated with linking the domestic markets of all its 
members is a serious issue. 
 
5.1.3 The Political Realities of Establishing an International Carbon 
Market 
A range of scholars has anticipated national trading systems to simply converge into a global 
one as countries have sought to redeem their Kyoto commitments. In any case, Victor (2011) 
argues that a convergence of national trading markets has not yet been evident. Instead, 
enthusiastic and reluctant countries have implemented caps that differ in ambition. The result 
is carbon prices that vary between emissions trading systems, ultimately creating a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 According to the authors ”bargaining power stems from the efficiency gains and positive reputation effects of 
linking” (Flachsland, 2008, p. 25). 
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fragmented system. It seems that countries are not willing to give up control over the costs 
and benefits of emissions trading in order to establish a global carbon price. The need for 
control can explain the EU’s restrictions on emissions trading with Russia. Russia’s 
emissions credits have been labelled “hot air” because their credits are believed to lack 
reliable value, thus failing to represent actual emissions cuts. In the area of emissions trading 
we have thus seen several examples of the discrepancy between politically feasible responses 
to mitigation goals that seem to dictate governmental action and the economic perceptions of 
which policies are most beneficial.  
 
Victor terms the hybrid systems developed by governments in a range of industrialized 
countries “Potemkin markets”. He defines them as “emission trading systems that look like 
real markets on the surface but, in fact, are designed to hide the real costs of compliance and 
to channel resources to well-organized groups” (2011, p. 80). In fact, developing countries 
such as China and India are also contemplating this type of solution. Carbon prices do not 
reflect real abatement costs because these are incorporated into other regulatory measures. 
Victor outlines an example of how this policy mix works within the energy sector. For many 
countries the electric power industry is part of their cap-and-trade system while 
simultaneously being subject to regulatory mandates of increasing its renewable energy 
share. Assuming that the command-and-control approach is successful in inducing companies 
to invest in renewable energy, the demand for emissions credits will decrease because the 
market is not the actual mechanism steering company investment decisions. In this example, 
emissions are cut and the costs of mitigation are hidden in electricity bills, making it easier 
for governments to implement this policy. 
 
Similarly, Victor (2011, p. 68) uses the EU’s climate policies to illustrate how governments 
for the most part rely on regulatory policies to reduce their emissions, despite the existence of 
a domestic emissions trading market. He underlines that only emissions from industrial 
sources are incorporated into the ETS and that the EU for the most part rely on regulatory 
policies to reduce their emissions. A key example of such policies is the laws introduced to 
enhance the energy performance and efficiency of buildings. Following Victor’s earlier 
assumptions, it is clear that residents are poorly organised and do not have a lot of choice 
when it comes to accepting these rules whereas the building industry are able to make a lot of 
money from producing new services and products house owners can purchase to fulfil the 
necessary requirements. However, such direct governmental regulation entails higher 
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economic costs than a market-based approach. In other words, the political benefits of 
camouflaging the mitigation costs demonstrates why a purely economic cost-benefit analysis 
is insufficient for explaining the policies governments choose to implement. 
 
Clearly, linking national Potemkin markets into a larger regional or international trading 
system is pointless as the markets are not actually driven by supply and demand and the 
prices do not convey the actual mitigation costs. By linking hybrid systems with ambitious 
national emissions trading systems, their ambitions are negatively affected by the decreasing 
carbon prices. According to Victor (2011, p. 81) trying to forcefully establish an international 
market will only drag the mitigation efforts of countries willing to do more down to the 
lowest common denominator and his solution is that enthusiastic countries with profitable 
markets establish common strict standards for policy implementation that countries will have 
to adopt in order to link their national market to these.  
 
According to Jaffe and Stavins (2008, p. 11), linking entails that while some actors benefit, 
others are bound to lose. The uneven effect of linkage for participating countries means that 
international emissions trading would most likely involve a global shift in wealth. Underdal 
et al. (2012, p. 482) present simulations of how joint emissions trading in combination with 
key actors adopting enhanced climate policies might affect the MACs of these countries. 
Because China and India face lower marginal abatement costs than Japan, the EU and the 
United States, their emission permits would be of a higher value. In short, the transfer of 
wealth from major industrialised countries to developing countries such as China and India 
might be unacceptable to some club members. It is thus important to balance the costs of 
emissions trading for these members with other complementary club goods that secure 
similarly significant benefits.  
 
To sum up, in this section I assessed the claim that emissions trading is a potential club good 
that can produce significant benefits for its members. Linking domestic emissions trading 
systems entails significant club benefits in theory but in reality, policy-makers are inclined to 
choose solutions that meddle with the market mechanisms and ultimately create a defective 
international carbon market. Furthermore, the case of emissions trading illustrates the fact 
that in order to avoid that the significance of club goods are reduced by the entry of new 
members, the club should establish common strict rules, policy targets and agreements on 
distribution of responsibilities. Otherwise, the ambitions of the enthusiastic countries are 
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brought down to the lowest common denominator. The following section assesses the second 
condition of keeping club goods exclusive to members in order to successfully attract 
reluctant countries. 
 
5.2 Exclusivity 
The condition of exclusivity refers to the importance of keeping club goods attainable for 
members only (Weischer et al., 2012, p. 187). The main function of exclusive club goods is 
to counteract incentives for free riding concerning climate change mitigation. Consequently, 
it strengthens the incentives for joining the club. Because a climate club provides a global 
public good, it is crucial that only members have access to additional club goods that reward 
their willingness to lead in mitigation matters. 
 
Club collaborations on green technology might not succeed in keeping the benefits within the 
club. However, taking measures to avoid that low carbon technology gets in the hands of 
non-members contradicts the club’s purpose of engaging others to address global warming. 
Consequently, claims have been made that transfers of low carbon technology is not a 
credible club good because it is not in the members’ interest to obstruct non-members from 
using these technologies to enhance mitigation. However, Gampfer (2014, p. 101) argues that 
it is possible to attend to both goals: domestic companies can export low carbon products and 
services to non-members and benefit from technology sharing in this respect rather than 
exporting the technology in itself. Still, it might prove hard to find ways of controlling 
technology diffusion and preventing citizens from non-member countries getting a hold of 
low-carbon technology developed by private companies or governmental bodies in member 
states. Another important point is that there already exist a great deal of international 
organizations and networks promoting technology cooperation between governments, regions 
and cities. The chances are there will be an overlap between the inventions and services 
developed in these bodies and in the climate club. It might prove hard to set up projects that 
are significantly more lucrative than other similar efforts that reluctant countries could just as 
easily take part in (and perhaps without being subject to stringent requirements and targets).  
 
Reducing obstacles to investments in foreign countries has been suggested as a potential club 
good. Ways to do so might include providing investors with enhanced information or 
relaxing certain regulations. However, Weischer et al. (2012, p. 190) discuss the difficulties 
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associated with making such improved investment conditions exclusive to club members. 
Reducing investment obstacles and changing regulations would benefit all foreign investors, 
regardless of their membership in a climate club. Still, a solution to the problem might be to 
set up information forums and “special investment promotion services” (Weischer et al., 
2012, p. 190).  
 
However, keeping club goods exclusive can produce unwanted external effects that in the 
long run harms the climate club’s goal of reducing global GHG emissions. Club 
collaborations on specific joint projects and investments illustrate this predicament. Member 
governments might introduce joint projects themselves or they could endorse enterprises 
originally initiated by the private sector as club investments and present them together with 
specific climate club goals. Fulfilling the second condition when setting up joint projects and 
investments as a club good can be challenging as it increases the risk of “negative spillovers 
into multilateral efforts” (Weischer et al., 2012, 187).  A concrete example of possible 
negative external consequences could be that technology sharing and cooperation in a climate 
club restrain members from contributing in the UNFCCC technology mechanism (Weischer 
et al., 2012, p. 187). According to Weischer et al. (2012, p. 187) it is extremely difficult to 
avoid this type of spillover but being aware of the effect while setting up club goods might 
reduce the risks.  
 
To sum up, keeping club goods exclusive to members are challenged by processes of 
technology diffusion and negative spillovers into multilateral efforts. The following section 
looks into the third condition for successfully applying club goods as incentives, namely the 
prospects of installing a catalogue of goods that are beneficial for all members. 
 
5.3 Benefits to All Members 
Making club goods beneficial for all members does not necessarily mean that all goods 
should be equally beneficial to all members. Instead it entails that the overall composition of 
goods includes programmes and commitments accommodated to members’ various needs 
(Weischer et al. 2012, p. 188). For collaborative efforts related to green technology it means 
that a broad range of various technologies should be included. The same goes for climate 
friendly products. Fulfilling the condition is crucial for incentivising as many states as 
possible to join. In this section I assess sources of conflict between developed and developing 
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countries that should be considered in the event that a climate club were to use trade liberal 
instruments on climate friendly goods. The discussion surrounds how the categorization and 
the liberalisation approach to climate friendly products might reduce benefits for some club 
members. These disputes are crucial points which need to be tackled through complex and 
lengthy negotiation processes and the CAD model might be a suitable design allowing for 
such detailed procedures. Weischer et al. (2012, p. 191) similarly envision a club facilitating 
country-specific “package(s) of incentives” according to their stated conditions. Additionally, 
financial assistance in the form of side-payments has been advocated as a promising club 
element that could compensate reluctant countries facing higher club fees than club benefits.   
 
5.3.1 Trade Instruments as Club Goods 
The main idea behind reducing or removing tariffs on sustainable energy goods is to 
strengthen the competitiveness of these products compared to high-carbon products 
(Weischer et al., 2012, p. 188). Initially, taking such measures can increase demand for 
export of low-carbon goods and thus create new markets. Parties to the WTO have 
considered connecting trade and environmental issues along these lines. In fact, participants 
of the current Doha Development Round have discussed the possibility of introducing a 
“reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental 
goods and services” (WTO, 2001). However, the WTO negotiations have stalled in a number 
of major areas, including the discussion on environmental goods (EGs)17. At the core of 
disagreement is the decision on which products to include in a list of “climate goods” as no 
mutually agreed upon definition of these goods exists. Several problems arise for WTO 
negotiators trying to classify EGs. First of all, deciding categories and subcategories of EGs18 
involves dealing with the issue of dual-use (Sugathan, 2009, p. 4). For instance, pipes can be 
used for environmental use in solar hot water systems but they can also be applied for non-
environmental use in oil and gas transportation.  
 
Reducing or removing tariffs and non-tariff barriers19 on sustainable energy goods are 
believed to be significant tools for increasing trade gains, thus securing significant economic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Yet, 14 WTO members acted outside the main negotiations and decided to remove tariffs on selected 
environmental goods with prospects of taking their ambitions back to the WTO later on (Sugathan, 2015, p. 20). 
18 The categories and subcategories of EGs are incporporated into the Harmonised Commodity Description and 
Coding System (HS) managed by the World Customs Organisation (WCO) (Sugathan, 2009, p. 3). 
19 Weischer et al. (2012, p. 189) list ”difficult customs procedures, divergent standards and certification rules 
(and) peculiar technical requirements” as examples of non-tariff barriers. 
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benefits for members (Sugathan, 2009, p. 1). In 2007, the World Bank issued a report on 
gains of liberalizing trade in clean energy technologies for 18 high-GHG-emitting developing 
countries20 (World Bank, 2007, p. 52). The analysis indicated that removing tariffs produced 
immense trade gains, which grew even larger with the elimination of non-tariffs barriers. The 
result indicates that addressing non-tariff barriers to climate goods and subsidies can be a 
more productive approach, as they often constitute larger obstacles for trade than tariffs do. 
 
An important aspect of using reductions and elimination of tariffs to incentivise reluctant 
countries is that decisions on product coverage and the chosen approach to liberalisation 
strongly affect which countries the club good applies to.  A general assumption is that climate 
friendly goods require a lot of capital and advanced technologies that developed and larger 
developing countries are in a better position to produce (Sugathan, 2009, p.5). If this is the 
case, trade gains from exporting EGs do not apply to the least developing countries. Indeed, 
Sugathan (2009, p. 5) shows examples of a range of middle-income developing countries 
(among others China, India and Brazil) responsible for large productions of clean energy 
technologies. A climate club that institutionalised trade liberalisation on green technology 
could thus effectively entice these reluctant countries to join. At the same time he 
underscores the opportunities for smaller developing countries to engage in South-South 
trade by exporting production surplus from own solar energy or wind energy sources. The 
main problem however is related to the classification of EGs. A large share of the mentioned 
dual-use products originate in small developing countries and if WTO members exclude 
these from the EG categories it significantly reduces their potential trade gains.   
 
The problem of including climate-friendly products that would also benefit the least 
developed countries results in several possible approaches to trade liberalisation of EGs. The 
“list approach” focuses on drafting a permanent list of climate goods that would be subject to 
reductions or elimination of tariffs (Sugathan, 2009, p. 5). Canada, the EU, Japan and the 
United States are among the countries advocating this type of liberalisation. On the other 
hand, India has launched a “project approach” that entails granting temporary liberalisation to 
goods and services that are part of environmental projects. The latter suggestion is aimed at 
solving the dual-use issue contrary to the “list approach”, which in general excludes such 
products. Furthermore, the “list approach” has been criticised for failing to complement tariff 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The report concentrated on four types of technologies: clean coal technologies, wind energy, solar 
photovoltaic systems, energy-efficient lighting (World Bank, 2007, p. 52). 
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liberalisation with other incentives for reluctant countries, such as technological and financial 
assistance, in order to create markets for sustainable energy goods in developing countries 
(Sugathan, 2009, p. 6; Vossenaar, 2010). Sugathan (2009, p. 7) calls for other instruments 
besides trade liberalisation to “address climate mitigation efforts in a broader sustainable 
development context”. According to him, many African states already have low tariffs on 
EGs but due to low purchasing power they are inclined to prioritise import of other goods. He 
holds IPRs as another barrier for developing countries. I assess the validity of his claim in 
section 5.5.1. It is clear that the overall composition of club goods should include other 
measures that more clearly benefit the least developed countries and enhance gains from 
trade liberalisation. 
As a concluding remark, Sugathan (2009) suggests an alternative to the cooperation on trade 
liberalisation taken under the WTO:  
Another option is a plurilateral agreement similar to the WTO Government 
Procurement Agreement, which members could opt to join or to stay outside of. The 
trade concessions would extend only to participating Members. Such an agreement 
could also eventually be made multilateral (with benefits extending to the entire 
membership) once a minimum number of countries, constituting a certain percentage 
of trade in these products and services, joined (p. 8).  
A climate club can constitute this type of multilateral agreement but it would nevertheless 
struggle to deal with the similar issues faced by WTO members, most importantly 
classification of EGs.    
Due to potential disputes between club members on which goods to include in a climate 
friendly list of products that would escape tariffs, scholars have proposed that a club could 
address non-tariff barriers instead. As already mentioned; focusing on non-tariff barriers 
would most likely create larger benefits for club members than eliminating trade tariffs 
(Weischer et al., 2012, p. 188). Because of the large amount of barriers and their complex 
nature it might be easier to find solutions on how to relax such obstacles in a smaller club 
compared to larger forums with a higher number of participating countries. Although this 
may be true, reducing non-tariff barriers for fellow club members might be inconsistent with 
the second condition of exclusivity. Furthermore, it might be at odds with the WTO’s non-
discrimination principles and thus have a hard time fulfilling the fourth condition of being 
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legally consistent (Weischer et al., 2012, p. 189).  
 
5.3.2 Side-payments 
Side-payments can be a crucial incentive that might eventually persuade reluctant countries 
to take the leap and join a climate club. Barrett and Stavins (2003, p. 360) define a side-
payment as “a direct money transfer made by one party or a set of parties to another”. It 
functions as a tool that compensates countries initially facing higher costs than benefits from 
club membership. When the costs are covered, reluctant countries have nothing to lose from 
joining the club. The Montreal Protocol’s Multilateral Fund (MLF) is a well-known example 
of this type of arrangement. It’s great success has inspired suggestions of applying similar 
mechanisms for climate change cooperation. Side-payments are believed to balance the 
asymmetries between developed and developing countries with regards to vulnerabilities, 
responsibilities and capacities to address global warming (see section 3.2). Side-payments 
could be negotiated through negotiation rounds on the various CADs. Still, it is important to 
realise that the desired effect of side-payments is contingent on the overall composition of 
club goods (Barrett, 2003, p. 351). Side-payments should be complimented by other 
significant club benefits; otherwise the enthusiastic countries gain little from participating. As 
the club attracts new members it will most likely be able to produce increasingly larger 
benefits. It becomes less dependent on side-payments because reluctant countries are 
motivated to join if these exclusive benefits outweigh the costs of membership21.  
 
To sum up, issues of product coverage and adopting a certain type of liberalisation approach 
can spur on an uneven distribution of benefits from reductions and eliminations of tariffs 
across member countries. Addressing non-tariff barriers on the other hand would run into 
some problems with fulfilling the fourth condition, namely being integrative with 
international law. Section 5.5 explores other club goods that face challenges in adapting to 
the international rules applicable to their domain. As a last point, side-payments is a 
promising tool for solving problems of asymmetries between club members and persuade 
reluctant countries to seek access to a climate club.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Results from simulations performed by Hovi et al. (2014, p. 23) support this argument. 
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5.4 Integrative with Existing International Law 
The last condition related to the ability of club goods to induce reluctant countries to join in 
on mitigation efforts deals with whether suggested club goods are inconsistent with the 
existing framework of international law (Weischer et al., 2012, p. 187). In order to limit the 
scope I focus on trade laws and their implications for proposed club goods. Of special 
concern is the WTO framework. Firstly, the non-discrimination principles agreed upon by 
WTO members in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) might cause 
problems for some of the proposed club goods, most notably linkages of domestic ETSs. 
Furthermore, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) sets guidelines for how to transfer technology from industrialised to developing 
countries. Collaboration on technology policies in a club demands less attention to trade laws.  
 
5.4.1 GATT’s Non-discrimination Principles 
The GATT’s non-discrimination principles are the most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment 
and the national treatment (WTO, 1986). Article I of the GATT outlines the MFN principle 
and clearly states that “any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any 
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be 
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for 
the territories of all other contracting parties” (WTO, 1986). However, there are a few 
exceptions to the MFN treatment. Of most interest for a climate club is the possibility of 
establishing a free trade area where club members can trade goods under favourable 
conditions and are allowed to discriminate against third parties.  
 
The second principle requires WTO members to treat foreign products in the same manner as 
local products once they have been introduced into the market. According to Zelli and van 
Asselt (2010, p. 81), the Kyoto Protocol’s article on international emissions trading can be 
deemed inconsistent with the GATT’s non-discrimination principles for trade. It states that 
countries not included in the Annex B group (i.e. developing countries and third parties to the 
agreement) cannot participate in the trade of emission allowances and hence it can be seen as 
violating the MFN principle. It introduces the possibility that linking ETS between members 
in a club might run into the same problems. However, GATT has not provided any 
definitions of “goods”, “products” and “services”. Zelli and van Asselt (2010, p. 81) therefore 
argue that emission allowances are not necessarily included in any of these groups. 
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Nevertheless, governments’ ability to freely allocate allowances to specific domestic 
industries might be labelled as subsidies favouring these enterprises over foreign ones. 
Handing out financial assets in this way thus might violate the WTO Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures (Zelli & van Asselt, 2010, p. 82). A more comprehensive legal 
analysis is needed to establish if emissions trading can be a legally consistent club good. 
 
5.4.2 Technology Transfers and WTO Laws on Intellectual Property 
Rights 
Transferring green technology between club members is a potentially significant club good 
with high chances of enticing reluctant countries to join. In the UNFCCC negotiations, China 
has demanded green technology transfers from industrialized countries to meet increasing 
energy demands while simultaneously easing their transition to a low-carbon economy 
(Conrad, 2012, p. 449). A recurring issue in the UNFCCC discussions on technology transfer 
is the role of IPRs. Developed countries have raised concerns about China’s failure to adopt a 
well-functioning system for managing IPRs. At the same time, developing countries regard 
the WTO’s laws on intellectual property rights as a barrier for transfers of green technology. 
This section deals with these conflicting views. I define green technologies broadly and draw 
on the definition used by the WTO secretariat22, which include “technology that makes 
products and processes more environmentally friendly” (WTO, 2012). However, throughout 
the section I focus especially on green energy technologies.  
 
The concept of technology transfer can refer to a range of different measures. In the 
UNFCCC, the demands of industrialized countries to facilitate transfers of climate-friendly 
technologies to developing countries entails contributing with knowledge and human 
resources as well as the technology in itself. Zelli and van Asselt (2010, p. 84) argue that 
instead of focusing on capacity-building in developing countries, companies in industrialized 
countries should be motivated to produce green technologies at home that are subject to 
reduced tariffs and reduced non-tariff barriers at the target country. This approach focuses on 
making it economically beneficial for enterprises to transfer technology through trade liberal 
instruments. In addition to difficulties of addressing non-tariff barriers due to the MFN 
treatment, their suggestion fails to consider other crucial aspects. Firstly, it means that trade 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The WTO Secretariat has issued a report and a further analysis as a response to the UN’s Rio + 20 
declaration. The analysis assesses what role IPRs play for innovation and diffusion of green technologies. 
	  64	  
gains from exports of climate friendly technologies only apply to developed countries. 
Secondly, it ignores the relevance of physical and human resources, as well as credit access, 
with regards to the capabilities of implementing these new technologies (see Littleton, 2009, 
p.234). Thirdly, the host country’s environmental laws and institutional framework are both 
factors that condition the demand for green technologies. Nevertheless, the WTO framework 
(mainly on IPRs) present potential obstacles for how green technology can be transferred, 
which the next section deals with.  
 
There are different opinions about whether or not IPRs promote or hamper technology 
transfers to developing countries. The main function of the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is arguably to target national 
protectionist behaviour in the area of intellectual property rights, thus handing over more 
power to technology developers (Zelli & van Asselt, 2010, p. 84). Most developed countries 
advocate IPRs as essential tools for ensuring innovation in green technologies. Because green 
technologies are a type of global public good, there has to be a system in place that 
safeguards and encourages developers and innovators. However, putting patents on green 
technologies demand high prices from companies located in developing countries that cannot 
afford such costs (Littleton, 2009, p. 234). Thus, many developing countries demand a less 
regulated system whereas the majority of developed countries continue to protect intellectual 
property rights (Shrivastava & Goel, 2010, p. 123). An example of a less stringent approach 
put forward by developing countries could be similar to the flexibilities introduced in article 
31 in TRIPS, which opens up for “other use of the subject matter of a patent without the 
authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third parties authorized 
by the government” (WTO, 1994, article 31). The term has later been referred to as 
“compulsory licenses” and their use are subject to several conditions (WTO, 2010). But 
according to the TRIPS, producers are still obliged to pay the patent owner in cases where the 
government allows for compulsory licensing (WTO, 2006). Hence, the flexibilities 
incorporated in the TRIPS do not reduce the costs of purchasing green technologies.  
 
However, another solution for a climate club might be that members share the IPRs of 
technological innovations created through joint R&D projects or pool patents that club 
members already own from previous research projects (Weischer et al., 2012, p. 190). In 
these patent pools “participating patent holders agree to license their technologies to one 
another”  (WTO, 1994, p. 10).  Some of these arrangements are also referred to as “joint 
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licensing schemes” (WTO, 1994, p. 10). A patent pool organized in a climate club would 
necessarily be a closed one and might thus be subject to criticism from competition 
watchdogs, most likely located in non-member countries.  
 
Ultimately, there seems to be a trade off between facilitating transfers of existing 
technologies and facilitating new innovations. Victor (2011, p. 140) argues that it is not a 
question of weakening or strengthening IPRs. In his opinion, the whole energy system is in 
great need of a transformation, which requires clearing the way for new ideas and not direct 
all attention to the diffusion of existing green technologies. An approach directed towards 
collaboration on technology policies thus values public research and aims at promoting 
favourable conditions for R&D. Section 5.5.3 presents Victor’s main reasons for reforming 
the global energy system and discusses ways of advancing these developments in a climate 
club.  
 
5.4.3 Innovation and Collaboration on Technology Policies 
Collaboration on green technology policies is more integrative with existing trade laws than 
for instance a club looking to broaden the scope of the TRIPS flexibilities. Victor (2011, p. 
116) looks into ways of restructuring the energy system and encouraging new ideas on how 
to make the renewable energy sector more viable by bettering power storage and power grid 
stability. He contradicts the view that simply replacing coal with cleaner energy and then 
diffusing these already existing technologies globally will cut emissions sufficiently. In his 
opinion, Europe and Japan’s failures of keeping emissions flat by merely expanding their use 
of wind power, nuclear reactors and gas supports this notion. As the demand for energy rises 
with a steady growing world population, making deep cuts in emissions demands a radical 
improvement of the energy system’s capabilities. Thus, instead of examining the best ways to 
transfer already existing green technologies to developing countries, he focuses on how 
governments can coordinate their technology policies to ensure that these new innovations 
are invested in and made commercially viable.  
 
According to Victor (2011, p. 116) technology policies are strongly needed because when 
governments do not interfere with market mechanisms in any degree they tend to underinvest 
in new technologies that often differs radically from the established ones. Additionally, 
crafting global warming policies becomes a more manageable issue for politicians when they 
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are able to launch technological solutions. Most importantly, Victor maintains that 
governmental technology policies should address problems of appropriability23 and lock-outs 
for new innovations trying to get a foot in the market. Basic research is often characterized by 
low appropriability as it has the potential to secure great, yet immeasurable, social benefits. It 
becomes risky for investors to support projects through a long and costly developing process 
with no assurances of being compensated for the enormous costs with similarly high and 
stabile future incomes. Lock-outs from the commercial market exist in many forms, from 
political and regulatory lock-outs to physical ones. Physical lock-outs might be obstacles for 
new technologies due to the fact that well-known energy technologies are better adapted to 
existing infrastructures. As already mentioned, Victor (2011, p. 140) rejects the idea that 
strengthening or weakening intellectual property rights is part of the solution to problems 
faced by new innovations, including leaks of technology. By strengthening intellectual 
property rights he fears that the potential social values of innovation might be jeopardized. 
Weakening strict patents is not a suitable approach to ensure new technologies are tested as 
investors would fear that they would not benefit from the innovation in the future. Instead, 
governments should help fund basic research and most importantly increase the 
appropriability of new ideas so that they become commercially viable. However, Victor 
argues that most countries have failed to do so in the energy industry, which has been 
characterized by deregulation and short- sighted competitive concerns.  
 
Simply funding institutions, e.g. universities, to continuously produce new energy 
technological ideas without encouraging investments in these innovations is futile. Victor 
argues that governments should be more active in the process of selecting and promoting 
specific innovations. This is where a climate club can play a vital part. Victor (2011, p. 148) 
proposes that “investments should be evaluated continuously against not just their own goals 
but also their role in a larger portfolio of low-emission technologies”.  A climate club can 
serve as a setting where countries can coordinate their technology policies to better fit larger 
globally interactive structures. Indeed, problems of appropriability and lock-out for new 
technologies are global in nature. Solving these issues therefore involves a more holistic take 
on changing the energy system. For example, if significant improvements in nuclear power 
plants were presented, less resources and focus would have to be devoted to developing low-
emission coal technologies as they also produce base load electricity. International 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Victor explains appropriability as ”the extent to which investors in innovation can internalize the value that 
arises if a new idea proves useful” (2011, p. 129). 
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coordination of technology policies additionally reduces the chances of lock-outs and 
malfunctioning of new technologies promoted by members. To demonstrate, large 
“NIMBY”24 protests against Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) from European and 
American citizens discourage foreign developers hoping to export their CCS technologies 
(Victor, 2011, p. 154). Furthermore, when countries are informed about the efforts of other 
states, the incentives for expanding own projects strengthens as the technology market grows. 
According to Victor (2011, p. 156), only a handful of countries is responsible for the majority 
of input (funding of R&D) and output (number of patents) to innovations. By all means, 
measuring input and output is hardly straight- forward. Furthermore, Victor’s calculations are 
based on general R&D funding and not projects directly aimed at the energy sector. Still, his 
analysis indicates that there are 5-10 countries ranking innovation inputs and outputs, which 
makes them tremendously important for the development of future energy technologies. 
These include the United States, Japan, China, Germany, France, United Kingdom and 
Canada (Victor, 2011, p. 161). A climate club including these countries would thus be 
exceptionally well-positioned to develop new and better green technological advancements in 
a harmonized manner. A possible way of managing coordination could be through CAD 
negotiations.  
 
Rank R&D spending Patents 
1 United States United States 
2 Japan Japan 
3 China Germany 
4 Germany Korea 
5 France France 
6 Korea  Switzerland 
7  United Kingdom Canada 
8 India United Kingdom 
9 Canada Netherlands 
10 Russia Italy 
 
Table 5.1: National rankings for innovation inputs (R&D) and outputs (patents). 
Source: Victor (2011, p. 161) and OECD (2008). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 NIMBY is an acronym for ”not in my backyard” and refers to citizen objections to CCS installations in own 
neighbourhoods. 
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To conclude, club goods might run into substantial problems in their effort to be legally 
consistent. First, I looked into how linking domestic ETSs and installing beneficial trade 
conditions are prone to violating the GATT’s non-discrimination principles. The second 
section presented a discussion of how the WTO’s framework for IPRs affect technology 
transfers to developing countries. Lastly, I focused on collaborations on technology policies 
as a possibly more legally consistent club good. R&D is a key element in this respect but also 
providing a setting where club members can coordinate their technology policies to ensure 
the emergence of new innovations that can reform the energy system. 
 
5.5 Credibility 
Barrett (2007, p. 82) underscores the importance of combining positive incentives with 
negative incentives as part of a long-term strategy of motivating reluctant countries to take on 
ambitious emissions reductions. Avoiding sanctions on the basis of being a club member can 
thus be an enticing club good. Also, trade restrictions might be imposed on non-compliant 
club members that have failed to deliver on their promises and targets. According to Barrett 
(2007, p. 100), successful sanctioning depends on a balance between severity and credibility. 
A stick can be of a considerable size and threatening to non-parties but still not function 
properly if reluctant countries believe it to be incredible. Victor (2011, p. 86) recognizes the 
potential high economic costs of using restrictions on trade as a punitive instrument but 
argues that it is politically necessary to do so. One of the largest benefits of trade restrictions 
is its ability to counteract carbon and trade leakage (Barrett & Stavins, 2003). However, the 
risks associated with introducing trade restrictions in a club are not to be taken lightly.  
 
5.5.1 Trade Restrictions as Sticks 
Trade restrictions and levies on import of goods according to their (levels of) carbon use have 
frequently been suggested as sanctions that might be set up in a climate club. Barrett (2007, 
p. 82) presents the Montreal Protocol as a model for how trade-related measures can be used 
to halt global warming. Parties to the agreement restricted their trade with non-parties of 
ozone- depleting substances (most notably CFCs) and products containing these substances. 
The type of restriction depends on the domestic mitigation policies of the club member in 
question. In a country where carbon taxes are used as a market incentive, the trade restriction 
would most likely be institutionalised as Border Tariff Adjustments (BTA) whereas a country 
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with a cap-and-trade system might sanction a non-compliant club member by demanding 
emissions permits when importing carbon intensive goods (Aakre, 2014, p.5). However, 
Barrett (2007, p. 101) raises an interesting question about which products should be subject 
to trade restrictions in a climate club. Nearly all kinds of goods produce GHG emissions in 
their manufacturing process. In fact, the Montreal Protocol had to dismiss the proposal of 
restricting trade of products made using CFCs because the enforcement of such a provision 
was considered to be too complicated. Enforcing BTAs on traded goods means that the 
amount of GHG emissions would have to be determined for every product (Barrett, 2003, p. 
388). 
 
The credibility of trade restrictive measures hinges upon the participation level (Barrett, 
2007, p. 100). Similar to the benefits of emissions trading, the number of club members thus 
conditions the success of applying trade restrictions. Not only does it increase the severity of 
trade restrictions and reduce the risks of trade leakages, but club members might also be 
reluctant to actually implement trade-related measures if a considerable amount of large trade 
markets (e.g. the United States) are still located on the outside of the club as this would harm 
them economically (Barrett, 2007, p. 83). The fear of countermeasures from the target 
country can also add to such resistance. Drawing on these ideas, it is reasonable to argue that 
the amount of club members is closely connected to trade restrictions’ ability to fulfil the first 
condition and function as significant club goods. In a small club, trade restrictive measures 
might quite simply impose too high costs on members. With this in mind it is reasonable to 
assume that trade-related measures are more likely to be institutionalised in a climate club at 
a later stage after positive incentives have managed to induce more countries to join the club. 
A club including all the major emitters might tip the cost-benefit calculus of reluctant 
countries that consider joining the club because the significant benefits of market access 
ensured by club membership would increase considerably. 
 
However, installing trade restrictive measures at a later stage when the participation level is 
high also entails serious risks. Club members have incentives to protect their national 
industries using comprehensive regulations as mentioned in section 5.1.3. Hence, fellow club 
members as well as countries located outside the club might have reasonable doubts about a 
member using border tariffs as a tool for protectionism. Club members employing trade 
restrictions might jeopardise the stability of WTO cooperation and in worst case launch trade 
wars where the threshold for sanctioning is drastically lowered (Victor, 2011, p 86). In other 
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words, a small climate club institutionalising trade restrictions as an incentive yet hesitating 
to actually use them against non-members will only hurt the credibility of these incentives.  
 
As a last point, a major concern is whether trade restrictions would be able to fulfil the fourth 
condition of being integrative with existing international law. Scholars have expressed 
reasonable doubts about whether trade restrictive measures applied in a climate club would 
be in accordance with the various trade institutions’ existing frameworks, most notably the 
WTO. Victor (2011, p. 86) expects that the urgent and increasing focus on climate change 
eventually makes a reform of GATT and other trade agreements (e.g. bilateral agreements 
and free trade areas) inevitable. Barrett (2007, p. 100) supports this notion. He argues that the 
trade restrictions applied in the Montreal Protocol most likely were not in line with the GATT 
and yet no signatories to the treaty resisted the use of such measures. A reform of WTO rules 
can certainly facilitate the use of trade restrictions in a climate club and in the mean time 
chances are that the trade organization turns a blind eye to certain oversteps as in the case of 
the Montreal Protocol.  
 
To sum up, increasing the participation level in a club can ensure severe and credible trade 
restrictions. Still, it does not alleviate the risks associated with protectionist trade wars. Even 
though there seems to be ways around the obstacles presented by the WTO framework, it 
might entail high costs if trade restrictions end up destabilising the WTO overall. In the 
following section I summarises the main points of chapter five. 
 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter focused on club goods as incentives for inducing reluctant countries to follow 
suit. It discussed the following points. 
 
First, the section on significance revealed that establishing a properly functioning 
international carbon market collides with certain political concerns and is incapable of 
providing significant club goods on its own. I also found that emissions trading is not a 
suitable tool for inducing reluctant countries to join a climate club because it demands a 
certain level of ambition from prospective members.  
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Second, I found that keeping club goods exclusive to members runs into problems of finding 
ways to control technology diffusion and avoiding unwanted external effects, such as 
negative spillovers into other arenas of climate cooperation. 
 
Third, keeping the overall composition of club goods beneficial for all members entails 
including a broad array of green technologies and climate friendly goods. I found that 
removing or eliminating tariffs and non-tariff barriers on clean energy technologies is a 
highly promising club good with the potential of generating large benefits for both developed 
and developing countries. Lastly, I found that side-payments are useful tools to employ at an 
early stage of a climate club. They can induce reluctant countries that face high membership 
costs to join by compensating them financially. 
 
Fourth, I assessed existing trade laws’ implications for emissions trading and technology 
transfers. I found that while many developing countries propose a relaxation of the WTO’s 
framework on IPRs in order to facilitate transfers of green technology, the majority of 
developed countries are afraid that by doing so, the incentives for innovation are removed. 
Instead of focusing on relaxing or strengthening IPRs, a club could direct its attention to the 
construction of patent pools. Another option is collaboration on R&D and technology policies 
that could foster new innovations able to reshape the global energy system.  
 
Fifth, I examined the condition of credibility in relation to applying trade restrictions as club 
sanctions. I found that trade restrictive measures are less likely to be implemented in a 
climate club when major economies are located on the outside of the club. This is because it 
jeopardises the first condition of significance and entails higher costs than benefits for its 
members. Regardless of the participation level, a club would in any case be subject to risks of 
border tariffs being employed by members to protect own industries, which could ultimately 
destabilise the WTO and at worst cause trade wars between its members. 
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6 Conclusion: Is the Club Approach a 
Feasible Alternative to the UN Climate 
Regime? 
 
This final chapter summarises the thesis, presents the main findings of my two-fold analysis 
and reflects on the prospects for and challenges of indirectly reaching an effective climate 
agreement through a club approach. 
 
6.1 Summary 
This thesis has analysed the following research question: What are the conditions (if any) 
under which a club might lead to an effective climate agreement?  
 
Chapter 2 provided some necessary background for understanding the current gridlock in the 
global climate negotiations. It presented the IPCC’s role and the timeline for the constantly 
evolving UN climate change regime.   
 
Chapter 3 began by introducing public goods theory as a premise for applying an alternative 
approach to the existing modes of international climate change cooperation. It summarised 
the previous literature on club theory and presented academic reviews of existing climate 
clubs.  
 
Chapter 4 assessed the following sub-question: Under which conditions can conditional 
commitments by enthusiastic countries induce reluctant countries to follow suit? Here, I 
assessed various models for implementing conditional commitments in a climate club. I used 
specific required conditions for well-functioning conditional commitments found in previous 
academic literature to structure the analysis, namely credibility, leverage, coordination and 
legitimacy. 
 
Chapter 5 assessed the following sub-question: Under which conditions can club goods 
induce reluctant countries to follow suit? The chapter focused on three main proposed types 
of club goods: emissions trading, cooperation on green technology and trade-related 
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measures. Similarly to chapter 4, I analysed this second sub-question according to each club 
good’s potential for fulfilling the conditions for success in incentivising reluctant countries, 
as proposed by other scholars. These conditions are: significance, exclusivity, benefits to all 
members, integrative with existing international law, and credibility. 
 
6.2 Main Findings 
Six main conclusions emerge from the analysis in this thesis. 
 
First, incorporating conditionality as a main platform for international cooperation on climate 
change has considerable potential. Still, the success of applying conditional commitments as 
incentives for reluctant countries depends on four conditions: credibility, leverage, 
coordination and legitimacy. Following a CAD model rather than the EU’s 20-20 by 2020 
policy is more likely to result in a credible conditional commitment. The EU launched 
emissions reduction targets for developed countries as one group and developing countries as 
a second group. This classification fails to recognize the country-specific capabilities and 
responsibilities within each group. Negotiating complex, contingent deals accommodated to 
every new club member‘s attributes and interests increases the chances of implementing 
climate policies at the domestic level and thus are more likely to bring about an effective 
climate agreement. Retaining control over the societal distribution of the costs and benefits of 
mitigation measures is a high political priority for most governments due to re-election 
concerns. Ignoring the influence of powerful economic sectors on domestic policy-making by 
placing too much importance on economic considerations or international targets eventually 
reduces the political feasibility, and thus effectiveness, of climate agreements.  
 
Second, the prospects of engaging China, a key player and the world’s largest emitter, in 
efforts to combat global warming are brighter in a climate club than in the UN regime. After 
the publication of Victor’s book in 2011, the CCP in China has been subject to increasing 
pressure from Chinese citizens to address global warming. Implementing effective climate 
policies has become of national interest as the social, economic and political benefits of 
transitioning to a low-carbon economy are becoming more evident. China needs green 
technology transfers and expertise to achieve this transition and a climate club that offers 
cooperation in this area might succeed in engaging the Chinese government in international 
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climate cooperation. In any case, the recent developments in China suggest that the country’s 
role as a reluctant participant in international climate negotiations might be changing. 
 
Third, failed attempts to engage a large amount of followers by conditional commitments 
might introduce perverse incentives to increase emissions. The threat of carbon leakage 
illustrates this point. Broadening participation in mitigation activities is a suitable response to 
carbon leakage. In fact, broadening participation has a reinforcing effect: the more countries 
that agree to emissions reduction policies, the more beneficial it becomes to participate in 
climate change mitigation efforts. Consequently, this positive feedback loop disturbs the 
economic mechanisms of carbon leakage. 
 
Fourth, the club goods have to be significant, exclusive, beneficial for all members, 
integrative with existing international law and credible in order to successfully induce 
reluctant countries to follow suit. If used alone, emissions trading is not a suitable incentive 
for inducing reluctant countries to follow suit because it requires a certain level of ambition 
and willingness to participate in mitigation from its prospective members. Furthermore, I 
found that establishing a properly functioning international carbon market entails a range of 
problems that might ruin the chances of generating significant benefits through linkages of 
domestic emissions trading markets at any stage in a climate club. The economic arguments 
favouring an international carbon market ultimately clashes with the political concerns taken 
by policy-makers. The outcome is hybrid systems that are not capable of equalizing marginal 
abatement costs across club members and consequently ruins Underdal et al.’s (2012, p. 481) 
vision of a ”regime of perfect coordination” partly created by the use of emissions trading. 
In contrast, removing or eliminating tariffs and non-tariff barriers on clean energy technology 
is a more promising club good that is capable of producing substantial trade gains. Depending 
on which approach to trade liberalisation the club adopts, trade liberalisation among club 
members can benefit developed as well as developing countries. Furthermore, a club can 
facilitate green technology transfers by establishing patent pools. More importantly, members 
can collaborate on technology policies to ensure new innovations that might reshape the 
energy system. Lastly, trade restrictions can induce reluctant countries to join, provided that 
the club has managed to include major economic players. Still, the risks of protectionist trade 
wars require policy-makers to think twice before installing trade restrictions as sanctions 
against outsiders of the club. Overall, processes of finding suitable club goods often run into 
the following conundrum: the main purpose of these incentives is to attract new club 
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members but my analysis reveals that in many cases the success of applying club goods 
usually require an already high participation level.  
 
As a fifth point, installing side-payments as a third club element addresses the asymmetry 
problems between club members. At the early stages of a club, before enough countries have 
joined and the club goods have become significantly attractive for prospective members, 
side-payments might be applied as a tool for compensating countries that face higher costs 
than benefits of joining the club. Put differently, it can alter the cost-benefit analysis of 
reluctant countries. 
 
Sixth, the analysis reveals that conditional commitments and club goods are intertwined 
processes that together might restructure incentives and greatly increase a climate club’s 
ability to ensure participation and compliance. Defective enforcement mechanisms are one of 
the main reasons why the Kyoto Protocol failed to engage reluctant countries. Tying access 
of club benefits to the promises governments make in the transition process towards club 
membership strengthens the prospects of high levels of participation and compliance to the 
club’s policies. The success of incorporating one element is thus conditioned by the other 
element.  
 
To conclude, under the right circumstances a club approach can help change the climate 
change mitigation game into a coordination game. Thus, if these circumstances are present, 
the club approach might represent a feasible alternative to the UN climate regime. 
 
6.3 Implications for a Club Approach 
My main findings suggest that policy-makers, when deciding on which club goods to 
incorporate, need to consider how the benefits would be distributed among member 
countries. For instance, middle-income developing countries such as Brazil, India and China 
are prominent players in the production of green technologies. Their interests and capacities 
thus differ greatly from smaller developing countries. This supports the conclusion that 
conditional commitments that are accommodated to every member country (e.g. the CAD 
model) represent a more viable model than commitments that only distinguish between 
developed and developing countries (e.g. the EU’s 20-20-20 model). 
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Using Victor’s CAD model better allows for the United States to fulfil its potential as an 
enthusiastic country. The gridlock at the federal, political level and the Byrd Hagel resolution 
prevents the United States from responding to or introducing time-limited conditional 
commitments with a top-up, similar to the EU’s 20-20-20 model. However, a CAD model 
also includes other forms of conditional commitments in addition to time-limited ones. Thus, 
the United States has the possibility of bidding conditional offers better adjusted to the slow 
and complicated federal processes of ratification and implementation. Yet, the United States’ 
motivation to launch ambitious offers is dependent on its access to significant club goods that 
could reward the country for spending large shares of own resources to combat global 
warming. Conditional commitments made by other states are insufficient as incentives on 
their own due to the fact that United States seems to be the main actor least sensitive to 
other’s mitigation efforts. Future research on climate clubs should direct its attention to 
detailed accounts and comprehensive legal analyses of how the United States can craft 
politically feasible, effective and beneficial conditional commitments, which might offer 
measures of direct regulation and state policies. Also, future club-theoretical contributions 
could narrow their scope and analyse specific reluctant countries (e.g. China, Brazil or India) 
in a club context in order to locate promising and country-specific incentives. 
 
Lastly, club design and timelines for when to establish the various club elements are 
important factors to consider. In order for climate clubs to successfully construct an effective 
climate agreement, the membership criteria must be stringent enough, and enthusiastic 
countries must provide club benefits that are sufficiently attractive to entice reluctant 
countries to raise their ambitions to the same level. Yet, there has to be a balance. A club 
starting out with too stringent targets might not induce a sufficient amount of club members 
and thus fail to reach the tipping point that transforms the climate change mitigation game 
into a coordination game. Whereas side-payments is a promising tool for attracting 
prospective members at an early stage, other club goods are more likely to be installed at a 
later stage because they demand a certain level of ambition from prospective members. The 
section on emissions trading illustrated this. Including countries with too lenient climate 
targets in a club would reduce the efficiency gains and positive reputation effects associated 
with linking domestic ETSs. Thus, a club without specific membership criteria could face the 
same destiny as the UNFCCC: that the ambitions of enthusiastic countries are brought down 
to the lowest common denominator.  
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